反事实及物性和先行词强化的充分条件

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI:10.5406/21521123.60.3.02

T. Haze

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文讨论了两种有争议的推理模式，涉及反事实条件句和虚拟条件句。给定一个关于反事实的真值条件的合理假设，表明只要与结论相关的世界集合是与前提相关的世界集的子集，那么在应用假设三段论（即传递性）时就不会出错。还表明，只要与结论相关的世界集是前提的世界集的子集，应用先行强化就不会出错。然后将这些结果应用于Lewis的反事实理论。

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Sufficient Conditions for Counterfactual Transitivity and Antecedent Strengthening

This paper is about two controversial inference-patterns involving counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Given a plausible assumption about the truth-conditions of counterfactuals, it is shown that one can't go wrong in applying hypothetical syllogism (i.e., transitivity) so long as the set of worlds relevant for the conclusion is a subset of the sets of worlds relevant for the premises. It is also shown that one can't go wrong in applying antecedent strengthening so long as the set of worlds relevant for the conclusion is a subset of that for the premise. These results are then adapted to Lewis's theory of counterfactuals.

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来源期刊

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.