{"title":"尊重个人、认识义务和分类政治无知","authors":"Kristian Skagen Ekeli","doi":"10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to clarify and elaborate some central aspects of my respect-based deontological theory of the moral responsibility and the epistemic duties of voters. The starting point is three objections to my theory set out by Cornelius and Herman Cappelen in their article “Democracy and Ignorance” in this issue.","PeriodicalId":32093,"journal":{"name":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Respekt for personer, epistemiske plikter og klanderverdig politisk uvitenhet\",\"authors\":\"Kristian Skagen Ekeli\",\"doi\":\"10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The aim of this paper is to clarify and elaborate some central aspects of my respect-based deontological theory of the moral responsibility and the epistemic duties of voters. The starting point is three objections to my theory set out by Cornelius and Herman Cappelen in their article “Democracy and Ignorance” in this issue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":32093,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Respekt for personer, epistemiske plikter og klanderverdig politisk uvitenhet
The aim of this paper is to clarify and elaborate some central aspects of my respect-based deontological theory of the moral responsibility and the epistemic duties of voters. The starting point is three objections to my theory set out by Cornelius and Herman Cappelen in their article “Democracy and Ignorance” in this issue.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
