Recognition Beyond French-German Divides: Engaging Axel Honneth

Can a theory of recognition provide not only a form of social critique but also a productive form of philosophical practice? This issue explores Axel Honneth’s approach to philosophy as an open, self-reflexive, and outwardly oriented discipline. One of the hallmarks of Honneth’s work has been his preparedness to engage cooperatively with a range of alternative positions in contemporary French philosophy, including the work of Derrida, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Castoriadis, Foucault, Rancière and Levinas, in developing a theory of recognition. In this respect, in contrast to Habermas’s much more critical and dismissive treatment of this line of thinkers and the limited reception of their work in terms of his own philosophy of language and theory of rationalisation, Honneth’s work has proven important for opening new lines of engagement with a range of traditions. This is especially the case in terms of emphasising the more phenomenological and existential aspects of the French tradition, for example, in Sartre’s work, with its focus on forms of existential denigration and affectivity; the preand extra-linguistic dimensions of sociality and non-deliberative aspects of social interaction; the importance of the asymmetricality of ethical relations highlighted by Derrida and Levinas, as well as a productive engagement with Foucault’s analysis of power and conflictual notion of the social understood as a field of strategic struggle. In this respect, Honneth has been particularly attuned to the existential experiences of social suffering and shame, and to feelings of disrespect as explanatory factors for social conflict and change. He acknowledges the important contribution of both Sartre and Foucault in identifying the more conflictual and negative dimensions of intersubjective and social relations; credits Sartre for drawing attention to the existential or emotional rather than merely epistemic stance to others and the world; and takes up Derrida’s and Levinas’s insights in regard to the unconditional responsibility to the other (which he applies to the sphere of intimate relations in his theory of recognition). These impulses have become guiding motifs in Honneth’s work: his theory of recognition is predicated on the lived experiences of disrespect that provide immanent resources within social life for the basis of social critique and transformation. In this