组织内部的欺诈报告和内部审计职能作为管理培训基地的使用

IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Alisa G. Brink, C. Eller, Karen Y. Green
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了将内部审计职能作为管理培训基地(MTG)和欺诈程度对内部欺诈报告决策的影响。两个实验考察了(1)内部审计师的报告行为,以及(2)其他员工直接向内部审计报告的意愿。在第一个实验中,经验丰富的内部审计师表明,内部审计作为MTG的使用可能会对内部审计师向首席审计官(CAE)报告欺诈行为的可能性产生负面影响。此外,将内部审计职能用作MTG会抑制内部审计师报告大型欺诈行为的紧迫感。第二个实验比较了管理会计师向匿名第三方热线报告与直接向内部审计报告的偏好。结果表明,对热线的偏好随着MTG的增加而增加。这种偏好完全由内部审计的可信度所介导,而内部审计受到MTG的负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fraud Reporting within an Organization and the Use of the Internal Audit Function as a Training Ground for Management
This study examines the effects of using the internal audit function as a management training ground (MTG) and fraud magnitude on internal fraud reporting decisions. Two experiments examine (1) internal auditors’ reporting behaviors, and (2) other employees’ willingness to report directly to internal audit. In the first experiment, experienced internal auditors indicate that the use of internal audit as a MTG may negatively impact fraud reporting likelihood by internal auditors to the Chief Audit Executive (CAE). Further, using the internal audit function as a MTG inhibits the sense of urgency internal auditors feel to report large fraudulent acts. The second experiment compares management accountants’ preferences for reporting to an anonymous third-party hotline versus reporting directly to internal audit. The results indicate a preference for the hotline that increases with a MTG. This preference is fully mediated by the perceived trustworthiness of internal audit, which is negatively impacted by a MTG.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
4.80%
发文量
11
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