Dealing with insecurities and geopolitics: science diplomacy at the poles

Global environmental crises are destabilizing the cryosphere and, as a result, the capacity of the planet's glaciated regions to absorb or even persist in the face of the current velocity of physical changes (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2019, Chown et al. 2022). According to the latest data, warming in the polar regions (Arctic and Antarctic) is occurring at three to four times global average rates. These regions should not be narrated through the prism of climate change alone, as the complex regional changes engendered by the environmental and climate crises also have profound effects on the rest of the world. At both poles, climate and environmental changes provide key warnings of potential global tipping points and underpin global environmental security concerns. The polar regions are vastly different in their geographies, populations and governance structures. However, in spite of these differences and ongoing crises, scientific cooperation has – at least until now – been a major contributor to regional governance at both poles. In the south, on top of international legal norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), since 1961 the Antarctic continent and surrounding Southern Ocean south of 60° of latitude has been governed by a major international treaty – the Antarctic Treaty – and its component instruments and their measures, referred to as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Apart from year-round but transient scientific operations, the Antarctic has never had a permanent human population. Under the Antarctic Treaty, national territorial claims in the region are held in abeyance. Seven states as well as the Russian Federation (as the successor state to the USSR) and the USA have made or 'reserved their right' to make territorial claims to parts of or the entire continent. However, Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty places these claims on hold – meaning no state can make new or expand their own sovereign claims. The ATS also prohibits military activities, the use of nuclear technologies and the disposal of radioactive waste, and it provides the frameworks for marine ecosystem and fisheries management and for environmental protection in Antarctica. Above all, the ATS provides the infrastructural mechanisms that enable state cooperation to achieve consensus governance of the Antarctic continent and surrounding Southern Ocean collectively and peacefully through science. Due to its contrasting geography, Arctic governance differs from that of its southern counterpart. As landmasses surrounding the Arctic Ocean, the eight Arctic states (the A8; Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, the Russian Federation and the USA) exercise their sovereignty over the land, with five of them having Arctic coastlines and sovereign rights over parts of the Arctic Ocean. Beyond general international law, the UNCLOS provides the regulatory framework to govern those parts of the Arctic Ocean and Southern Ocean not subject to sovereign rights. Since the 1990s, the A8 have cooperated at first through the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and later through the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996 under the Ottawa Declaration – a political declaration as opposed to an international treaty – the Arctic Council has served as a high-level intergovernmental forum for the A8 and six Indigenous political representations to flexibly work together on scientific research and policy recommendations relating to social and environmental issues. Thus far, both regions, however, have somehow been able to respond to significant geopolitical and environmental challenges. Despite their structural differences, science diplomacy and scientific research have provided two pillars for both Arctic and Antarctic cooperation. Science therefore offers an avenue to think about solutions for future geopolitical polar challenges and security issues. However, can polar governance survive both the unfolding threat of a melting Earth and the latest upsurge in global geopolitical instabilities, in particular driven by Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine? This is where polar science and the science–policy nexus become matters of regional and international security. Through a critical international relations lens, security in the Arctic and the Antarctic clearly extends beyond environmental and economic security, although this should not be only understood as military security, especially since military issues are often – deliberately – off the table in both governance settings. For instance, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration explicitly expressed the wish of the A8 to keep military matters out of the Arctic Council's mandate. However, it is notable that, as a consequence of the current conflict and the massive global geopolitical ramifications that this is leading to, the Arctic Council has currently postponed all planned meetings for an undefined period, even though Russia currently holds the Council's Presidency. While Arctic scientific collaboration and diplomacy have been on hold, the 'Arctic 7' – all of the Arctic states except the Russian doi:10.1017/S095410202200027X