无党派背景下的候选人进入:来自印度尼西亚的证据

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Nathan Allen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么候选人要参加竞选?候选人进入的理性模型提供了一个吝啬的解释,重点是获胜的概率、任职的好处以及竞选成本。高质量的挑战者在获胜概率很高的情况下参赛,而长距离比赛则吸引业余选手。在大多数情况下,政党的存在使得很难将候选人的决定与组织招聘策略区分开来。为了检验候选人进入理性模型的基本假设,本研究报告考察了印尼地区代表委员会(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah,DPD)的候选人进入决定,该委员会是世界上最大的民选无党派议会。对所有四次民主党选举的选区级候选人名单的分析表明,进入决定受到获胜概率的影响,在上一次选举中,进入选票更集中的选区的候选人更少。有可能获胜的DPD比赛吸引了更多有经验的挑战者、党派业余爱好者和无党派业余爱好者。只有无党派业余候选人的数量与社会人口变量一致,这进一步突显了选举背景对雄心勃勃、精通政治的精英的重要性。研究结果肯定了理性模型的广泛适用性,并将印尼经常被忽视的DPD作为战略行为的场所。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Candidate entry in a non-partisan context: Evidence from Indonesia
Why do candidates enter an electoral contest? The Rational Model of Candidate Entry offers a parsimonious explanation focusing on the probability of victory, the benefit of holding office, as well as campaign costs. Quality challengers enter when there is a high probability of victory, while long-shot races attract amateurs. In most contexts, the presence of parties makes it difficult to disentangle candidate decisions from organizational recruitment strategies. To test the basic assumptions of the Rational Model of Candidate Entry, this Research Note examines candidate entry decisions in Indonesia's Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), the world's largest elected non-partisan assembly. An analysis of constituency-level candidate lists in all four DPD elections indicates that entry decisions are affected by the perceived probability of victory, with fewer candidates entering in constituencies with a more concentrated vote in the previous election. Potentially winnable DPD races attract a greater number of experienced challengers, partisan amateurs, and non-partisan amateurs. Only the number of non-partisan amateur candidates consistently correlates with socio-demographic variables, further underlining the importance of electoral context for ambitious, politically savvy elites. The findings affirm the broad applicability of the Rational Model and spotlight Indonesia's often-overlooked DPD as a venue of strategic behaviour.
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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