The ‘presidential accordion’ in times of crisis: is it still well tuned?

ABSTRACT The article analyses the role of the President of the Italian Republic (PoR) as it relates to the process of government formation during the political, economic, and pandemic crises of the last three legislatures. The analysis focuses on the political actions of Giorgio Napolitano and Sergio Mattarella, the two Presidents of the Republic elected (and re-elected) as heads of state during those crises. To explain how the PoR operates when forming a government, the article examines the conditions allowing the functioning of the ‘presidential accordion’, i.e. the expansion and contraction of the presidential powers in the process of government formation. The presidential accordion hypothesis has been supported by many empirical studies focussing on the role of the PoR in the Italian parliamentary system. The aim of this study is further empirically to test the hypothesis in order to verify whether profound exogenous crises, such as recent economic and pandemic crises, can be considered as independent or intervening variables strengthening or weakening the PoR in the Italian political system.