{"title":"上帝和孤独的世界","authors":"Gaven Kerr","doi":"10.1177/00211400221144750","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The recent aloneness argument against the classical conception of God seeks to undermine divine simplicity by showing that whatever way you cut it, there is some knowledge that God has contingently. That being the case, God has some contingent property not essential to Him, and if so, He is not utterly simple. The authors of the aloneness argument present it as a problem for any classical theist. In what follows, I seek to show that Aquinas’s conception of God avoids the challenge of the aloneness argument.","PeriodicalId":55939,"journal":{"name":"Irish Theological Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"God and the Alone World\",\"authors\":\"Gaven Kerr\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00211400221144750\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The recent aloneness argument against the classical conception of God seeks to undermine divine simplicity by showing that whatever way you cut it, there is some knowledge that God has contingently. That being the case, God has some contingent property not essential to Him, and if so, He is not utterly simple. The authors of the aloneness argument present it as a problem for any classical theist. In what follows, I seek to show that Aquinas’s conception of God avoids the challenge of the aloneness argument.\",\"PeriodicalId\":55939,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Irish Theological Quarterly\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Irish Theological Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00211400221144750\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"RELIGION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Irish Theological Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00211400221144750","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent aloneness argument against the classical conception of God seeks to undermine divine simplicity by showing that whatever way you cut it, there is some knowledge that God has contingently. That being the case, God has some contingent property not essential to Him, and if so, He is not utterly simple. The authors of the aloneness argument present it as a problem for any classical theist. In what follows, I seek to show that Aquinas’s conception of God avoids the challenge of the aloneness argument.
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