独裁统治中灌输的部分有效性

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H Pierskalla
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要独裁者依靠一个坚定的官僚机构来实施他们的政策偏好。但是,他们是如何在公务员队伍中获得忠诚和努力的呢?作者研究了通过强制兵役进行灌输是实现这一目标的一种具有成本效益的战略。征兵制度使该政权能够让新兵,包括未来的公务员,在受控的环境中接受密集的“政治培训”,这应该会提高系统的参与度。为了验证这一假设,作者分析了前德意志民主共和国370000多名干部的档案数据。利用1962年gdr引入的强制性服务来进行因果识别,他们发现征兵对官僚的制度参与有积极影响。额外的分析表明,这种影响可能不是由深层次的规范内化引起的。研究结果更符合这样一种观点,即政治训练使新兵熟悉精英偏好,使他们能够按照游戏规则进行战略性行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Partial Effectiveness of Indoctrination in Autocracies
Abstract Dictators depend on a committed bureaucracy to implement their policy preferences. But how do they induce loyalty and effort within their civil service? The authors study indoctrination through forced military service as a cost-effective strategy for achieving this goal. Conscription allows the regime to expose recruits, including future civil servants, to intense “political training” in a controlled environment, which should improve system engagement. To test this hypothesis, the authors analyze archival data on over 370,000 cadres from the former German Democratic Republic. Exploiting the introduction of mandatory service in the gdr in 1962 for causal identification, they find a positive effect of conscription on bureaucrats’ system engagement. Additional analyses indicate that this effect likely did not result from deep norm internalization. Findings are more compatible with the idea that political training familiarized recruits with elite preferences, allowing them to behave strategically in accordance with the rules of the game.
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来源期刊
World Politics
World Politics Multiple-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs
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