德黑兰证券交易所盈余管理、CEO薪酬与股票回报的关系

Q2 Social Sciences
Mahdi Moardi, M. Salehi, Simin Poursasan, Homa Molavi
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引用次数: 11

摘要

本文旨在探讨盈余管理与首席执行官薪酬之间的关系。由于盈余管理不仅具有机会效应,而且具有信号效应,因此本研究将重点放在应计项目质量上,以检验盈余管理激励。因此,应计质量是根据未来现金流量来描述的。经验证据表明,可操纵性应计利润与未来现金流量之间的正相关关系为盈余管理提供了预测因素,而可操纵性应计利润与未来现金流量之间的负相关关系则为盈余管理提供了机会因素。如果可支配性应计利润与未来现金流量之间不存在显著关系,则不存在盈余管理,这一结果表明,这些公司的激励和管理者的绩效存在差异。本研究的统计人口包括2009-2016年德黑兰证券交易所的所有上市公司。采用面板数据法对研究模型进行估计。研究结果表明,制药和食品行业的可操纵性应计利润与未来现金流量之间不存在显著关系,因此它们既不存在预测性盈余管理,也不存在机会主义盈余管理;而机械、汽车、矿产和化工行业的可操纵性应计利润与未来现金流量之间存在显著负相关关系。此外,可以断言,机会主义盈余管理企业的ceo薪酬与其他类型的盈余管理没有显著差异。这表明企业没有适当的ceo薪酬计划。此外,本研究亦探讨盈余管理与股票收益的关系。我们证明股票收益受应计质量及其组成部分的影响。换句话说,有代工企业和没有任何盈余管理的企业的股票收益显著不同。,作者的发现提供了贡献;对于管理者来说,值得注意的是,股票市场对财务报表及其所承担的程序有足够的理解,从而在公平信息的基础上获得更高的回报。对于投资者和监管机构来说,利用这些发现,可能会对区分机会主义和非机会主义行业有更深的理解,这反过来又会带来更好的决策和监管。以前的研究主要是调查原始设备制造商,而目前的研究调查了盈余管理的信号和机会主义方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Relationship between earnings management, CEO compensation, and stock return on Tehran Stock Exchange
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between earnings management and chief executive officers’ (CEOs) compensation. Owing to the fact that earnings management does not have only opportunistic effects, but signaling effects, this study focuses on accruals quality to examine earnings management incentives. Thus, accruals quality is described against future cash flow. The empirical evidences suggest that a positive relationship between discretionary accruals and future cash flow provides predictive elements for earnings management, whereas a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and future cash implies to opportunistic elements for earnings management. Should there is no significant relationship between discretionary accruals and future cash flow, there will be no earnings management, and such a result suggests that incentives and managers’ performance in these firms differ.,The statistical population of this research consists of all listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2016. Panel data method is applied in order to estimate the research model.,Findings of the study show that there is no significant relationship between discretionary accruals and future cash flow in pharmaceutical and food industries, thus they have neither predictive nor opportunist earnings management, while the results evidence a negative significant relationship between discretionary accruals and future cash flow in machineries, automobile, mineral and chemical industries. Furthermore, it can be alleged that there is no significant difference between CEOs’ compensation in firms with opportunistic earnings management (OEM) and other types of earnings management. It shows that firms do not have appropriate plans for CEOs’ compensation. Moreover, the relationship between earnings management and stock return has been investigated in this study. We document that stock return is influenced by accruals quality and its components. In other words, stock return significantly differs in firms with OEM and firms without any kind of earnings management.,The authors’ findings provide contributions; for managers, it is noticeable that stock markets have sufficient comprehension about financial statements and the undertaken procedures on them, resulting in a higher return base on fair information. For investors and regulators, using the findings, may have deeper understanding to distinguish between industries that are recognized as opportunistic and non-opportunistic, which, in turn, results in better decision and regulation.,Previous studies have been mostly investigated OEM, while the current study examines both signaling and opportunistic aspects of earnings management.
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来源期刊
International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior
International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior Social Sciences-Public Administration
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior brings together researchers and practitioners, both within and outside the United States, who are in the areas of organization theory, management, development, and behavior. This journal covers all private, public and not-for-profit organizations’ theories and behavior.
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