托马斯·杰克逊和约翰·洛克的个人化、身份认同与复活

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Jon W. Thompson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文概述了17世纪两位思想家(托马斯·杰克逊和约翰·洛克)对复活形而上学问题的看法。我表明,杰克逊和洛克都偏离了17世纪中期学术界对复活和哲学人类学的信念(信念见第二节)。每个人都认为,物质或物质的连续性并不是人类等生物体历时个性化的合理原则。尽管他们拒绝传统观点,但他们都为个人死后的可能性提供了辩护。我在第三节至第四节中概述了这些(截然不同的)辩护。然后我认为(第五节),洛克可能读过杰克逊关于复活的文章,或者两人受到了一个共同来源的影响。我认为,无论是在日常的活体情况下,还是在复活的情况下,物质都可能提供一个合适的历时个性化原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Individuation, Identity, and Resurrection in Thomas Jackson and John Locke
This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in section II). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (quite different) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue (section V) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
24
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