{"title":"托马斯·杰克逊和约翰·洛克的个人化、身份认同与复活","authors":"Jon W. Thompson","doi":"10.5840/ACPQ202147222","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in section II). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (quite different) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue (section V) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection.","PeriodicalId":44497,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Individuation, Identity, and Resurrection in Thomas Jackson and John Locke\",\"authors\":\"Jon W. Thompson\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/ACPQ202147222\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in section II). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (quite different) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue (section V) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44497,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPQ202147222\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPQ202147222","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Individuation, Identity, and Resurrection in Thomas Jackson and John Locke
This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in section II). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (quite different) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue (section V) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection.