{"title":"瑞典基本安全利益部分战略自治的演变","authors":"M. Lundmark","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2021.1992713","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":"399 - 420"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Evolution Towards the Partial Strategic Autonomy of Sweden’s Essential Security Interests\",\"authors\":\"M. Lundmark\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10242694.2021.1992713\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47477,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Defence and Peace Economics\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"399 - 420\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Defence and Peace Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1992713\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Defence and Peace Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1992713","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Evolution Towards the Partial Strategic Autonomy of Sweden’s Essential Security Interests
ABSTRACT This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.
期刊介绍:
Defence and Peace Economics embraces all aspects of the economics of defence, disarmament, conversion and peace. Examples include the study of alliances and burden-sharing; military spending in developed and developing nations; arms races; terrorism; country surveys; the impact of disarmament on employment and unemployment; the prospects for conversion and the role of public policy in assisting the transition; the costs and benefits of arms control regimes; the arms trade; economic sanctions; the role of the United Nations.