CEO雇佣合同期限与财务报告自由裁量权

IF 1.4 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-30 DOI:10.2308/jmar-16-123

G. Gong, Juan Wang, Hyun Jung Lee

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们考察了雇佣合同期限对经理在财务报告中自由裁量权的影响。在合同期内，董事会从公司业绩中了解新CEO的能力，并利用这些信息来决定是否续签或终止CEO的合同。经济理论表明，随着董事会对首席执行官能力的估计变得更加精确，公司业绩对董事会学习的信息价值会随着时间的推移而下降；这促使首席执行官在合同期的早期阶段更加激进地夸大收入。一贯地，我们发现在第一个合同期的前（后）阶段，更多（更少）激进的收益夸大。这一发现对于那些对合同终止更为担忧的首席执行官和那些对操纵收益有更大灵活性的CEO来说更为有力。我们的证据表明，首席执行官的雇佣合同期限对财务报告中的管理自由裁量权有重大影响。JEL分类：G34；J41；M40；M41。

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CEO Employment Contract Horizon and Financial Reporting Discretion

We examine the effect of employment contract horizon on managers' discretion in financial reporting. During the contract horizon, the board learns about a new CEO's ability from realized firm performance and uses this information to determine whether to renew or terminate the CEO's contract. Economic theory suggests that the informational value of firm performance to the board's learning declines over time as the board's estimate of the CEO's ability becomes more precise; this motivates a CEO to overstate earnings more aggressively during the earlier stage of the contract horizon. Consistently, we find more (less) aggressive earnings overstatement during the earlier (later) stage of the first contract horizon. This finding is stronger for CEOs who have greater concerns over contract termination and CEOs who have greater flexibility to manipulate earnings. Our evidence suggests that the CEO employment contract horizon has a significant impact on managerial discretion in financial reporting. JEL Classification: G34; J41; M40; M41.

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来源期刊

Journal of Management Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.