经济MAD:大国竞争中中等大国的战略工具

IF 0.1 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Ewan Smith, Shin‐wha Lee
{"title":"经济MAD:大国竞争中中等大国的战略工具","authors":"Ewan Smith, Shin‐wha Lee","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2022.08.20.2.213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Cold War theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which described the reciprocal damage resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, can be expanded in the 21st century to include more dimensions including climate and the economy. The economic dimension of MAD (dubbed as EMAD) is a situation where one country is incapable of disrupting trade with a target country without also causing itself significant economic d[amage. This can occur given the presence of a specific economic advantage on which the coercing power relies. How can the presence of EMAD help afford middle powers more leeway in their alignment decisions within this strategic dilemma? What economic advantages create a stronger situation of EMAD? In line with these inquiries, this article investigates three cases, each with differing degrees of economic MAD: the 2016 Korea-China dispute over THAAD deployment;the 2020 Australia-China dispute over Covid-19;and the 2022 case of Korea's participation in IPEF. After all, middle powers need to develop a 'collective security-type arrangement' where China's wielding of economic muscle against any middle power state is considered an aggression against all other middle powers, which act together or collectively assist the target state to make the most of EMAD vis-a-vis China. For this, it is reasonable and realistic to promote the democratic liberal international order (LIO) by aligning with U.S.-led minilateral and multilateral initiatives or mechanisms. Yet, it is also important to identify areas and ways to engage with China rather than alienating or excluding it on the international stage.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Economic MAD as Middle Powers’ Strategic Tool in the Great Power Rivalry\",\"authors\":\"Ewan Smith, Shin‐wha Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.14731/kjis.2022.08.20.2.213\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Cold War theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which described the reciprocal damage resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, can be expanded in the 21st century to include more dimensions including climate and the economy. The economic dimension of MAD (dubbed as EMAD) is a situation where one country is incapable of disrupting trade with a target country without also causing itself significant economic d[amage. This can occur given the presence of a specific economic advantage on which the coercing power relies. How can the presence of EMAD help afford middle powers more leeway in their alignment decisions within this strategic dilemma? What economic advantages create a stronger situation of EMAD? In line with these inquiries, this article investigates three cases, each with differing degrees of economic MAD: the 2016 Korea-China dispute over THAAD deployment;the 2020 Australia-China dispute over Covid-19;and the 2022 case of Korea's participation in IPEF. After all, middle powers need to develop a 'collective security-type arrangement' where China's wielding of economic muscle against any middle power state is considered an aggression against all other middle powers, which act together or collectively assist the target state to make the most of EMAD vis-a-vis China. For this, it is reasonable and realistic to promote the democratic liberal international order (LIO) by aligning with U.S.-led minilateral and multilateral initiatives or mechanisms. Yet, it is also important to identify areas and ways to engage with China rather than alienating or excluding it on the international stage.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41543,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Korean Journal of International Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Korean Journal of International Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2022.08.20.2.213\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Korean Journal of International Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2022.08.20.2.213","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

冷战时期的相互保证毁灭理论描述了使用核武器造成的相互损害,在21世纪可以扩展到包括气候和经济在内的更多层面。MAD(被称为EMAD)的经济层面是指一个国家无法在不给自己造成重大经济损失的情况下扰乱与目标国家的贸易[混乱。考虑到胁迫力量所依赖的特定经济优势的存在,这种情况可能会发生。EMAD的存在如何帮助中等强国在这一战略困境中的结盟决策提供更多的回旋余地?什么样的经济优势会使EMAD的处境更为有利?根据这些调查,本文调查了三个案例,每个案例都有不同程度的经济MAD:2016年韩中萨德部署争端;2020年澳大利亚-中国新冠肺炎争端;以及2022年韩国参与IPEF的案例。毕竟,中间大国需要制定一种“集体安全型安排”,在这种安排中,中国对任何中间大国动用经济力量都被视为对所有其他中间大国的侵略,这些中间大国共同或集体协助目标国家充分利用对中国的EMAD。为此,通过与美国领导的双边和多边倡议或机制保持一致,促进民主自由的国际秩序是合理和现实的。然而,确定与中国接触的领域和方式也很重要,而不是在国际舞台上疏远或排斥中国。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Economic MAD as Middle Powers’ Strategic Tool in the Great Power Rivalry
The Cold War theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which described the reciprocal damage resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, can be expanded in the 21st century to include more dimensions including climate and the economy. The economic dimension of MAD (dubbed as EMAD) is a situation where one country is incapable of disrupting trade with a target country without also causing itself significant economic d[amage. This can occur given the presence of a specific economic advantage on which the coercing power relies. How can the presence of EMAD help afford middle powers more leeway in their alignment decisions within this strategic dilemma? What economic advantages create a stronger situation of EMAD? In line with these inquiries, this article investigates three cases, each with differing degrees of economic MAD: the 2016 Korea-China dispute over THAAD deployment;the 2020 Australia-China dispute over Covid-19;and the 2022 case of Korea's participation in IPEF. After all, middle powers need to develop a 'collective security-type arrangement' where China's wielding of economic muscle against any middle power state is considered an aggression against all other middle powers, which act together or collectively assist the target state to make the most of EMAD vis-a-vis China. For this, it is reasonable and realistic to promote the democratic liberal international order (LIO) by aligning with U.S.-led minilateral and multilateral initiatives or mechanisms. Yet, it is also important to identify areas and ways to engage with China rather than alienating or excluding it on the international stage.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Korean Journal of International Studies
Korean Journal of International Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信