xi-西哈阿论两个探询悖论

Q1 Arts and Humanities
Nilanjan Das
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)一书中,这位十二世纪的哲学家和诗人Śrīharṣa讲述了一个版本的Meno悖论。这个悖论的版本在公元一千年前的南亚通过两位早期的梵语哲学家Śabarasvāmin(公元4 - 5世纪)和Śaṃkara(公元8世纪)的著作而广为人知。这两位思想家都提出了解决这个悖论的方法。我展示了Śrīharṣa如何拒绝这种解决方案,并将旧的悖论分解为两个新的悖论:琐碎的悖论和不连贯的悖论。我认为,这些悖论与Śrīharṣa对成功理性探究某些哲学问题的可能性的更广泛的悲观主义有关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
xi —Śrīharṣa on Two Paradoxes of Inquiry
In A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya), the twelfth-century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa addresses a version of Meno’s paradox. This version of the paradox was well known in first millennium South Asia through the writings of two earlier Sanskrit philosophers, Śabarasvāmin (4th–5th century ce) and Śaṃkara (8th century ce). Both these thinkers proposed a solution to the paradox. I show how Śrīharṣa rejects this solution, and splits the old paradox into two new ones: the paradox of triviality and the paradox of incoherence. I argue that these paradoxes are connected to Śrīharṣa’s broader pessimism about the possibility of successful rational inquiry into certain philosophical questions.
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来源期刊
Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society contains the papers read at the Society"s fortnightly meetings in London throughout the academic year, and short discussion notes on these papers. Papers are drawn from an international base of contributors and discuss issues across a broad range of philosophical traditions, including those which are of greatest current interest.
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