Brian A. Miller
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{"title":"《爵士乐的所有规则》","authors":"Brian A. Miller","doi":"10.30535/MTO.26.3.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Though improvising computer systems are hardly new, jazz has recently become the focus of a number of novel computer music projects aimed at convincingly improvising alongside humans, with a particular focus on the use of machine learning to imitate human styles. The a empt to implement a sort of Turing test for jazz, and interest from organizations like DARPA in the results, raises important questions about the nature of improvisation and musical style, but also about the ways jazz comes popularly to stand for such broad concepts as “conversation” or “democracy.” This essay explores these questions by considering robots that play straight-ahead neoclassical jazz alongside George Lewis’s free-improvising Voyager system, reading the technical details of such projects in terms of the ways they theorize the recognition and production of style, but also in terms of the political implications of human-computer musicking in an age of algorithmic surveillance and big data. Volume 26, Number 3, September 2020 Copyright © 2020 Society for Music Theory [0.1] In 2016, the Neukom Institute for Computational Science at Dartmouth College began hosting the “Turing Tests in Creative Arts,” a set of yearly competitions in music and literature intended to “determine whether people can distinguish between human and algorithmic creativity.”(1) The musical categories for the most recent contest in 2018 include “Musical Style or Free Composition” and “Improvisation with a Human Performer.” In the former, computational systems have to generate music in the style of Charlie Parker given a lead sheet, Bach’s chorales given a soprano line, electroacoustic music given some source sound, or “free composition,” apparently also in a given style. The improvisation challenge tests a system’s musicality and interactivity with a human collaborator in either jazz or free composition. And while few can claim to have won prizes for passing it, the Turing test is often invoked by researchers developing algorithmic musical systems. (2) The Flow Machines project at the Sony Computer Science Laboratories, led by François Pachet until his recent departure for Spotify, touts its Continuator (which uses a variable-order Markov model to improvise in the style of a human pianist by way of a call-and-response exchange) as having passed the Turing test, and press coverage often invokes the term when discussing a more recent project from the same team aimed at generating pop songs (Jordan 2017). Similarly, computer scientist Donya Quick’s “Kuli a” system has garnered headlines like, “If There Was a Turing Test for Music Artificial Intelligence, ‘Kuli a’ Might Pass It” (Synthtopia 2015); other recent online articles have asked, “Can We Make a Musical Turing Test?” (Hornigold 2018) and answered, “A New AI Can Write Music as Well as a Human Composer” (Kaleagasi 2017). [0.2] Many of these articles appear on sites with names like “SingularityHub” and “Futurism”; often, the Turing test is less a measure of actual computational achievement than a marker for a certain kind of popular techno-optimist (even if cynical) view of artificial intelligence and computation in general. Indeed, various scholars have argued that the test itself is widely misunderstood, owing not least to Turing himself, who begins the paper that introduces the “imitation game” with the provocation: “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’” (1950, 433).(3) But he immediately backtracks, arguing that the question as posed is untenable, and goes on to suggest the game itself as a “closely related” replacement. In the game, a man and a woman are located in one room, and an interrogator in another; the la er asks questions of both the man and the woman in order to identify which is which, where the woman answers truthfully and the man tries to cause the interrogator to choose incorrectly.(4) The question now, rather than “Can machines think?” is “What will happen when a machine takes the part of [the man] in this game?” (Turing 1950, 434). Popular accounts of the test almost never account for two related aspects of the game, namely the inclusion of a gendered component and the doubled form of imitation involved, in which a computer imitates a man imitating a woman. Though the test is almost always understood—even in many scholarly accounts—as a ma er of making a choice between “machine or human,” Turing gives no clear indication that the addition of the machine changes the interrogator’s options from “man or woman.”(5) Thus the “imitation” in the game is not directly of human thought by mechanical means, but rather of human imitative abilities themselves—the imitation of imitation.(6) [0.3] Turing’s work on artificial intelligence is also inseparable from his codebreaking work for the British military during the Second World War, and a parallel conjuncture manifests itself today, perhaps surprisingly, in musical terms. Beginning in 2015, the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding a project called Musical Interactive Collaborative Agent (MUSICA).(7) The project is part of DARPA’s Communicating with Computers program, which “aims to enable symmetric communication between people and computers in which machines are not merely receivers of instructions but collaborators, able to harness a full range of natural modes including language, gesture and facial or other expressions.”(8) Apparently music is one such mode: the end goal of MUSICA is to produce a jazz-playing robot capable of performing convincingly with human collaborators. One of the project’s directors, Kelland Thomas, suggests that “jazz and improvisation in music represent a pinnacle of human intellectual and mental achievement” (quoted in Del Prado 2015; see Chella and Manzo i 2012 for a similar argument and an explicit proposal for a jazz Turing test). And while DARPA is famous for funding unorthodox, long-shot projects, the clear implication is that jazz improvisation is so paradigmatically representative of more general modes of human interaction that its technological replication would have some kind of military value going beyond its intellectual or aesthetic meaning. Though li le detailed information on the project is publicly available, MUSICA is based in large part on machine learning techniques—advances in computational capabilities since Turing’s time that I will return to in some detail below. According to Thomas: “We’re going to build a database of musical transcription: every Miles Davis solo and every Louis Armstrong solo we’re going to hand-curate. We’re going to develop machine learning techniques to analyze these solos and find deeper relationships between the notes and the harmonies, and that will inform the system—that’ll be the knowledge base” (quoted in Thielman 2015). Though the broader claim— linking jazz to conversation in natural language and suggesting that modeling the former computationally is the best way to learn anything useful about the la er—evokes difficult questions about the relation between music and language, in its actual implementation MUSICA is more immediately concerned with questions of musical style. While the project’s few public statements never define jazz explicitly, it appears that what is at issue is a very specific, stereotypical view: smallto medium-sized jazz combos playing standards in a relatively conventional format; in other words, the neoclassical style associated with conservative institutions like Jazz at Lincoln Center (see Chapman 2018). While the machine learning model is intended to capture the characteristic ways players like Armstrong and Davis form musical u erances, it is far from clear exactly how the system would reconcile such varied styles as Armstrong’s 1920s New Orleans sound and Davis’s “electric” work from the 1970s, or even to what extent the project recognizes such differences as relevant for musical interaction. [0.4] This article examines several different approaches to computational improvisation, all in the orbit of jazz but implementing two very different styles. While li le information and no technical details about MUSICA are publicly available, another project, from the Robotic Musicianship Group at Georgia Tech’s Center for Music Technology, takes a similar approach to robotic jazz and has published a number of papers focused on the project’s technical aspects as well as many publicly available performance videos.(9) This robot, named Shimon, plays the marimba alongside humans in a traditional jazz combo based on a conventional understanding of key, harmony, and form, but with a complex machine learning-based model for generating solos. I compare Shimon to a computer program called Impro-Visor (Gillick, Tang, and Keller 2010), which does not perform in real time but which generates solos in a similar style using a different corpus-based machine learning model, and I contrast both of these systems with George Lewis’s Voyager, a long-standing project that stems from Lewis’s work in free improvisation.(10) [0.5] The juxtaposition has a dual focus: first, how do these computational approaches to improvisation handle the challenges of imitating human musical styles, and how is style itself theorized both implicitly and explicitly? In other words, how do the features and affordances of computation become musical in relation to such varied human improvisatory practices? Because all of these systems change frequently (for example, Voyager having been updated over the course of several decades, and Shimon having multiple modes of operation along with various upgrades), my account is not necessarily concerned with capturing any system’s exact functioning in any particular performance, nor am I interested in determining what the “best” computational implementation of jazz or free improvisation might be. Instead, for each system, I read the available technical details, however partial, for what they reveal about","PeriodicalId":44918,"journal":{"name":"Music Theory Online","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"“All of the Rules of Jazz”\",\"authors\":\"Brian A. Miller\",\"doi\":\"10.30535/MTO.26.3.6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Though improvising computer systems are hardly new, jazz has recently become the focus of a number of novel computer music projects aimed at convincingly improvising alongside humans, with a particular focus on the use of machine learning to imitate human styles. The a empt to implement a sort of Turing test for jazz, and interest from organizations like DARPA in the results, raises important questions about the nature of improvisation and musical style, but also about the ways jazz comes popularly to stand for such broad concepts as “conversation” or “democracy.” This essay explores these questions by considering robots that play straight-ahead neoclassical jazz alongside George Lewis’s free-improvising Voyager system, reading the technical details of such projects in terms of the ways they theorize the recognition and production of style, but also in terms of the political implications of human-computer musicking in an age of algorithmic surveillance and big data. Volume 26, Number 3, September 2020 Copyright © 2020 Society for Music Theory [0.1] In 2016, the Neukom Institute for Computational Science at Dartmouth College began hosting the “Turing Tests in Creative Arts,” a set of yearly competitions in music and literature intended to “determine whether people can distinguish between human and algorithmic creativity.”(1) The musical categories for the most recent contest in 2018 include “Musical Style or Free Composition” and “Improvisation with a Human Performer.” In the former, computational systems have to generate music in the style of Charlie Parker given a lead sheet, Bach’s chorales given a soprano line, electroacoustic music given some source sound, or “free composition,” apparently also in a given style. The improvisation challenge tests a system’s musicality and interactivity with a human collaborator in either jazz or free composition. And while few can claim to have won prizes for passing it, the Turing test is often invoked by researchers developing algorithmic musical systems. (2) The Flow Machines project at the Sony Computer Science Laboratories, led by François Pachet until his recent departure for Spotify, touts its Continuator (which uses a variable-order Markov model to improvise in the style of a human pianist by way of a call-and-response exchange) as having passed the Turing test, and press coverage often invokes the term when discussing a more recent project from the same team aimed at generating pop songs (Jordan 2017). Similarly, computer scientist Donya Quick’s “Kuli a” system has garnered headlines like, “If There Was a Turing Test for Music Artificial Intelligence, ‘Kuli a’ Might Pass It” (Synthtopia 2015); other recent online articles have asked, “Can We Make a Musical Turing Test?” (Hornigold 2018) and answered, “A New AI Can Write Music as Well as a Human Composer” (Kaleagasi 2017). [0.2] Many of these articles appear on sites with names like “SingularityHub” and “Futurism”; often, the Turing test is less a measure of actual computational achievement than a marker for a certain kind of popular techno-optimist (even if cynical) view of artificial intelligence and computation in general. Indeed, various scholars have argued that the test itself is widely misunderstood, owing not least to Turing himself, who begins the paper that introduces the “imitation game” with the provocation: “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’” (1950, 433).(3) But he immediately backtracks, arguing that the question as posed is untenable, and goes on to suggest the game itself as a “closely related” replacement. In the game, a man and a woman are located in one room, and an interrogator in another; the la er asks questions of both the man and the woman in order to identify which is which, where the woman answers truthfully and the man tries to cause the interrogator to choose incorrectly.(4) The question now, rather than “Can machines think?” is “What will happen when a machine takes the part of [the man] in this game?” (Turing 1950, 434). Popular accounts of the test almost never account for two related aspects of the game, namely the inclusion of a gendered component and the doubled form of imitation involved, in which a computer imitates a man imitating a woman. Though the test is almost always understood—even in many scholarly accounts—as a ma er of making a choice between “machine or human,” Turing gives no clear indication that the addition of the machine changes the interrogator’s options from “man or woman.”(5) Thus the “imitation” in the game is not directly of human thought by mechanical means, but rather of human imitative abilities themselves—the imitation of imitation.(6) [0.3] Turing’s work on artificial intelligence is also inseparable from his codebreaking work for the British military during the Second World War, and a parallel conjuncture manifests itself today, perhaps surprisingly, in musical terms. Beginning in 2015, the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding a project called Musical Interactive Collaborative Agent (MUSICA).(7) The project is part of DARPA’s Communicating with Computers program, which “aims to enable symmetric communication between people and computers in which machines are not merely receivers of instructions but collaborators, able to harness a full range of natural modes including language, gesture and facial or other expressions.”(8) Apparently music is one such mode: the end goal of MUSICA is to produce a jazz-playing robot capable of performing convincingly with human collaborators. One of the project’s directors, Kelland Thomas, suggests that “jazz and improvisation in music represent a pinnacle of human intellectual and mental achievement” (quoted in Del Prado 2015; see Chella and Manzo i 2012 for a similar argument and an explicit proposal for a jazz Turing test). And while DARPA is famous for funding unorthodox, long-shot projects, the clear implication is that jazz improvisation is so paradigmatically representative of more general modes of human interaction that its technological replication would have some kind of military value going beyond its intellectual or aesthetic meaning. Though li le detailed information on the project is publicly available, MUSICA is based in large part on machine learning techniques—advances in computational capabilities since Turing’s time that I will return to in some detail below. According to Thomas: “We’re going to build a database of musical transcription: every Miles Davis solo and every Louis Armstrong solo we’re going to hand-curate. We’re going to develop machine learning techniques to analyze these solos and find deeper relationships between the notes and the harmonies, and that will inform the system—that’ll be the knowledge base” (quoted in Thielman 2015). Though the broader claim— linking jazz to conversation in natural language and suggesting that modeling the former computationally is the best way to learn anything useful about the la er—evokes difficult questions about the relation between music and language, in its actual implementation MUSICA is more immediately concerned with questions of musical style. While the project’s few public statements never define jazz explicitly, it appears that what is at issue is a very specific, stereotypical view: smallto medium-sized jazz combos playing standards in a relatively conventional format; in other words, the neoclassical style associated with conservative institutions like Jazz at Lincoln Center (see Chapman 2018). While the machine learning model is intended to capture the characteristic ways players like Armstrong and Davis form musical u erances, it is far from clear exactly how the system would reconcile such varied styles as Armstrong’s 1920s New Orleans sound and Davis’s “electric” work from the 1970s, or even to what extent the project recognizes such differences as relevant for musical interaction. [0.4] This article examines several different approaches to computational improvisation, all in the orbit of jazz but implementing two very different styles. While li le information and no technical details about MUSICA are publicly available, another project, from the Robotic Musicianship Group at Georgia Tech’s Center for Music Technology, takes a similar approach to robotic jazz and has published a number of papers focused on the project’s technical aspects as well as many publicly available performance videos.(9) This robot, named Shimon, plays the marimba alongside humans in a traditional jazz combo based on a conventional understanding of key, harmony, and form, but with a complex machine learning-based model for generating solos. I compare Shimon to a computer program called Impro-Visor (Gillick, Tang, and Keller 2010), which does not perform in real time but which generates solos in a similar style using a different corpus-based machine learning model, and I contrast both of these systems with George Lewis’s Voyager, a long-standing project that stems from Lewis’s work in free improvisation.(10) [0.5] The juxtaposition has a dual focus: first, how do these computational approaches to improvisation handle the challenges of imitating human musical styles, and how is style itself theorized both implicitly and explicitly? In other words, how do the features and affordances of computation become musical in relation to such varied human improvisatory practices? Because all of these systems change frequently (for example, Voyager having been updated over the course of several decades, and Shimon having multiple modes of operation along with various upgrades), my account is not necessarily concerned with capturing any system’s exact functioning in any particular performance, nor am I interested in determining what the “best” computational implementation of jazz or free improvisation might be. 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“All of the Rules of Jazz”
Though improvising computer systems are hardly new, jazz has recently become the focus of a number of novel computer music projects aimed at convincingly improvising alongside humans, with a particular focus on the use of machine learning to imitate human styles. The a empt to implement a sort of Turing test for jazz, and interest from organizations like DARPA in the results, raises important questions about the nature of improvisation and musical style, but also about the ways jazz comes popularly to stand for such broad concepts as “conversation” or “democracy.” This essay explores these questions by considering robots that play straight-ahead neoclassical jazz alongside George Lewis’s free-improvising Voyager system, reading the technical details of such projects in terms of the ways they theorize the recognition and production of style, but also in terms of the political implications of human-computer musicking in an age of algorithmic surveillance and big data. Volume 26, Number 3, September 2020 Copyright © 2020 Society for Music Theory [0.1] In 2016, the Neukom Institute for Computational Science at Dartmouth College began hosting the “Turing Tests in Creative Arts,” a set of yearly competitions in music and literature intended to “determine whether people can distinguish between human and algorithmic creativity.”(1) The musical categories for the most recent contest in 2018 include “Musical Style or Free Composition” and “Improvisation with a Human Performer.” In the former, computational systems have to generate music in the style of Charlie Parker given a lead sheet, Bach’s chorales given a soprano line, electroacoustic music given some source sound, or “free composition,” apparently also in a given style. The improvisation challenge tests a system’s musicality and interactivity with a human collaborator in either jazz or free composition. And while few can claim to have won prizes for passing it, the Turing test is often invoked by researchers developing algorithmic musical systems. (2) The Flow Machines project at the Sony Computer Science Laboratories, led by François Pachet until his recent departure for Spotify, touts its Continuator (which uses a variable-order Markov model to improvise in the style of a human pianist by way of a call-and-response exchange) as having passed the Turing test, and press coverage often invokes the term when discussing a more recent project from the same team aimed at generating pop songs (Jordan 2017). Similarly, computer scientist Donya Quick’s “Kuli a” system has garnered headlines like, “If There Was a Turing Test for Music Artificial Intelligence, ‘Kuli a’ Might Pass It” (Synthtopia 2015); other recent online articles have asked, “Can We Make a Musical Turing Test?” (Hornigold 2018) and answered, “A New AI Can Write Music as Well as a Human Composer” (Kaleagasi 2017). [0.2] Many of these articles appear on sites with names like “SingularityHub” and “Futurism”; often, the Turing test is less a measure of actual computational achievement than a marker for a certain kind of popular techno-optimist (even if cynical) view of artificial intelligence and computation in general. Indeed, various scholars have argued that the test itself is widely misunderstood, owing not least to Turing himself, who begins the paper that introduces the “imitation game” with the provocation: “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’” (1950, 433).(3) But he immediately backtracks, arguing that the question as posed is untenable, and goes on to suggest the game itself as a “closely related” replacement. In the game, a man and a woman are located in one room, and an interrogator in another; the la er asks questions of both the man and the woman in order to identify which is which, where the woman answers truthfully and the man tries to cause the interrogator to choose incorrectly.(4) The question now, rather than “Can machines think?” is “What will happen when a machine takes the part of [the man] in this game?” (Turing 1950, 434). Popular accounts of the test almost never account for two related aspects of the game, namely the inclusion of a gendered component and the doubled form of imitation involved, in which a computer imitates a man imitating a woman. Though the test is almost always understood—even in many scholarly accounts—as a ma er of making a choice between “machine or human,” Turing gives no clear indication that the addition of the machine changes the interrogator’s options from “man or woman.”(5) Thus the “imitation” in the game is not directly of human thought by mechanical means, but rather of human imitative abilities themselves—the imitation of imitation.(6) [0.3] Turing’s work on artificial intelligence is also inseparable from his codebreaking work for the British military during the Second World War, and a parallel conjuncture manifests itself today, perhaps surprisingly, in musical terms. Beginning in 2015, the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding a project called Musical Interactive Collaborative Agent (MUSICA).(7) The project is part of DARPA’s Communicating with Computers program, which “aims to enable symmetric communication between people and computers in which machines are not merely receivers of instructions but collaborators, able to harness a full range of natural modes including language, gesture and facial or other expressions.”(8) Apparently music is one such mode: the end goal of MUSICA is to produce a jazz-playing robot capable of performing convincingly with human collaborators. One of the project’s directors, Kelland Thomas, suggests that “jazz and improvisation in music represent a pinnacle of human intellectual and mental achievement” (quoted in Del Prado 2015; see Chella and Manzo i 2012 for a similar argument and an explicit proposal for a jazz Turing test). And while DARPA is famous for funding unorthodox, long-shot projects, the clear implication is that jazz improvisation is so paradigmatically representative of more general modes of human interaction that its technological replication would have some kind of military value going beyond its intellectual or aesthetic meaning. Though li le detailed information on the project is publicly available, MUSICA is based in large part on machine learning techniques—advances in computational capabilities since Turing’s time that I will return to in some detail below. According to Thomas: “We’re going to build a database of musical transcription: every Miles Davis solo and every Louis Armstrong solo we’re going to hand-curate. We’re going to develop machine learning techniques to analyze these solos and find deeper relationships between the notes and the harmonies, and that will inform the system—that’ll be the knowledge base” (quoted in Thielman 2015). Though the broader claim— linking jazz to conversation in natural language and suggesting that modeling the former computationally is the best way to learn anything useful about the la er—evokes difficult questions about the relation between music and language, in its actual implementation MUSICA is more immediately concerned with questions of musical style. While the project’s few public statements never define jazz explicitly, it appears that what is at issue is a very specific, stereotypical view: smallto medium-sized jazz combos playing standards in a relatively conventional format; in other words, the neoclassical style associated with conservative institutions like Jazz at Lincoln Center (see Chapman 2018). While the machine learning model is intended to capture the characteristic ways players like Armstrong and Davis form musical u erances, it is far from clear exactly how the system would reconcile such varied styles as Armstrong’s 1920s New Orleans sound and Davis’s “electric” work from the 1970s, or even to what extent the project recognizes such differences as relevant for musical interaction. [0.4] This article examines several different approaches to computational improvisation, all in the orbit of jazz but implementing two very different styles. While li le information and no technical details about MUSICA are publicly available, another project, from the Robotic Musicianship Group at Georgia Tech’s Center for Music Technology, takes a similar approach to robotic jazz and has published a number of papers focused on the project’s technical aspects as well as many publicly available performance videos.(9) This robot, named Shimon, plays the marimba alongside humans in a traditional jazz combo based on a conventional understanding of key, harmony, and form, but with a complex machine learning-based model for generating solos. I compare Shimon to a computer program called Impro-Visor (Gillick, Tang, and Keller 2010), which does not perform in real time but which generates solos in a similar style using a different corpus-based machine learning model, and I contrast both of these systems with George Lewis’s Voyager, a long-standing project that stems from Lewis’s work in free improvisation.(10) [0.5] The juxtaposition has a dual focus: first, how do these computational approaches to improvisation handle the challenges of imitating human musical styles, and how is style itself theorized both implicitly and explicitly? In other words, how do the features and affordances of computation become musical in relation to such varied human improvisatory practices? Because all of these systems change frequently (for example, Voyager having been updated over the course of several decades, and Shimon having multiple modes of operation along with various upgrades), my account is not necessarily concerned with capturing any system’s exact functioning in any particular performance, nor am I interested in determining what the “best” computational implementation of jazz or free improvisation might be. Instead, for each system, I read the available technical details, however partial, for what they reveal about