ESG披露、CEO权力和激励与企业风险承担

IF 2.1 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Faek Menla Ali, Yuanyuan Wu, Xiaoxiang Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了环境、社会和治理(ESG)信息披露对企业风险承担的影响,以及这种影响如何进一步受到美国公司首席执行官(CEO)权力和激励的影响。我们发现,无论是基于会计收益还是基于市场收益,环境、社会和治理信息披露都会降低企业的风险承担。此外,我们还发现,在首席执行官有权有势的公司中,ESG 披露比基于会计的风险承担更能有效降低基于市场的风险承担。与此相反,首席执行官的 ESG 激励参与奖金削弱了 ESG 披露对减少这两种风险承担的影响。我们的分析有助于理解在不同的管理相关因素下,ESG 披露在协调所有利益相关者利益方面的不同权衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk-taking

This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk-taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk-taking based on both accounting-based and market-based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market-based risk-taking than accounting-based risk-taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG-incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk-taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade-offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial-related factors.

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来源期刊
European Financial Management
European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
18.20%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.
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