模态现实主义和岛屿宇宙的可能性:为什么不存在可能世界

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY

Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2020-11-03 DOI:10.1515/mp-2019-0027

Jiri Benovsky

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这篇文章中，我为刘易斯模态现实主义辩护，反对“岛屿宇宙”和其他类似案例的可能性所引起的反对意见。这个问题来自刘易斯的主张，即可能世界在时空上是孤立的。我建议对刘易斯模态实在论进行修改，以避免这一系列反对意见。这种修改可能听起来很激进，因为它等于放弃了一个可能世界的概念，但实际上，尽管听起来很激进，但它仍然很好地保留了刘易斯最初观点的精神。

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Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds

Abstract In this article, I defend Lewisian modal realism against objections arising from the possibility of ‘Island Universes’ and other similar cases. The problem comes from Lewis’ claim that possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated. I suggest a modification of Lewisian modal realism in order to avoid this family of objections. This modification may sound quite radical since it amounts to abandoning the very notion of a possible world, but as radical as it may sound it in fact remains well in the spirit of Lewis’ original view.

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来源期刊

Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.30

自引率

50.00%

发文量