论行动中的知识

IF 1.1 4区心理学 Q3 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Theory & Psychology Pub Date : 2023-06-30 DOI:10.1177/09593543231170854

G. Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani

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引用次数: 0

摘要

什么样的心理状态指导我们的行为?人们普遍认为，行为的执行是由有关如何执行该行为的相关知识状态所指导的。然而，并不是所有人都同意这种知识背后的心理状态。有些人认为，知道如何执行一个动作主要与执行该动作的方式的命题表示有关。那些反对这一观点的人强调运动的作用，非命题表征作为负责动作表现的心理状态。这篇文章的目的是克服这种二分法，通过展示一个认知过程的解释，知道如何执行一个动作需要两个命题状态和运动状态。我们为这一观点辩护，提供了一种解释，说明我们关于一个动作的命题知识是由指导动作执行的动机表征构成的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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On knowledge in action

What mental states guide the execution of our actions? It is generally agreed that the execution of an action is guided by the relevant knowledge state concerning how to perform that action. However, not all agree on which mental states underlie such a knowledge. Some suggest that knowing how to perform an action has mainly to do with the propositional representation about the way to execute that action. Those opposing this view stress the role of the motor, non-propositional representation as the mental state responsible for action performance. The aim of this article is to overcome this dichotomy by showing that an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying knowing how to perform an action needs both propositional and motor states. We defend this view by providing an account of the way in which our propositional knowledge about an action is constituted by the motor representation that guides the execution of that action.

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来源期刊

Theory & Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： Theory & Psychology is a fully peer reviewed forum for theoretical and meta-theoretical analysis in psychology. It focuses on the emergent themes at the centre of contemporary psychological debate. Its principal aim is to foster theoretical dialogue and innovation within the discipline, serving an integrative role for a wide psychological audience. Theory & Psychology publishes scholarly and expository papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: cognitive, social, personality, developmental, clinical, perceptual or biological psychology.