MIMO有线抽头干扰网络中的友好干扰:一种非凸博弈方法

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Peyman Siyari, M. Krunz, Diep N. Nguyen
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引用次数: 21

摘要

我们考虑了MIMO窃听干扰网络中人工噪声(AN)和信息信号的联合优化,其中每个链路的传输可能被几个MIMO窃听者窃听。每个信息信号都伴随着由同一用户产生的AN,以迷惑附近的窃听者。利用非合作博弈,提出了一种分布式优化机制,使各链路的保密率最大化。这里的决策变量是信息信号和an的协方差矩阵。然而,每个环节的优化问题(即最佳对策)的非凸性使得传统的凸对策不适用,即使是寻找纳什均衡(NE)是否存在。为了解决这个问题,我们使用一个称为准ne (QNE)的放松均衡概念来分析所提出的博弈。在每个玩家问题的约束限定条件下,qne集合包括所提议游戏的NE。我们还推导了所得到的QNE的存在唯一性的条件。事实证明,唯一性条件限制太大,在典型的网络场景中并不总是成立。因此,所提出的博弈通常有多个QNE,并不能保证收敛到一个QNE。为了克服这些问题,我们通过在每个效用函数中添加几个特定的术语来修改玩家的效用函数。即使存在多个QNE,修改后的博弈也收敛于一个QNE。此外,玩家有能力选择一个理想的QNE,以优化给定的社交目标(例如,总和率或保密总和率)。根据所选择的目标,可以控制信令开销的数量以及所产生的QNE的性能。仿真结果表明,该算法不仅可以保证收敛到QNE,而且由于QNE的选择机制,在保密和速率和功率效率方面取得了显著的提高,特别是在密集网络中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Friendly Jamming in a MIMO Wiretap Interference Network: A Nonconvex Game Approach
We consider joint optimization of artificial noise (AN) and information signals in a MIMO wiretap interference network, wherein the transmission of each link may be overheard by several MIMO-capable eavesdroppers. Each information signal is accompanied with AN, generated by the same user to confuse nearby eavesdroppers. Using a noncooperative game, a distributed optimization mechanism is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of each link. The decision variables here are the covariance matrices for the information signals and ANs. However, the nonconvexity of each link’s optimization problem (i.e., best response) makes conventional convex games inapplicable, even to find whether a Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. To tackle this issue, we analyze the proposed game using a relaxed equilibrium concept, called quasi-NE (QNE). Under a constraint qualification condition for each player’s problem, the set of QNEs includes the NE of the proposed game. We also derive the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the resulting QNE. It turns out that the uniqueness conditions are too restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the proposed game often has multiple QNEs, and convergence to a QNE is not always guaranteed. To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of the players by adding several specific terms to each utility function. The modified game converges to a QNE even when multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, players have the ability to select a desired QNE that optimizes a given social objective (e.g., sum rate or secrecy sum rate). Depending on the chosen objective, the amount of signaling overhead as well as the performance of resulting QNE can be controlled. Simulations show that not only can we guarantee the convergence to a QNE, but also due to the QNE selection mechanism, we can achieve a significant improvement in terms of secrecy sum rate and power efficiency, especially in dense networks.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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