董事会效应及ceo / cfo对公司治理披露的调节作用:来自东非的证据

IF 2 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Samuel E. Fulgence, A. Boateng, Yan Wang, Frank O. Kwabi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了董事会规模和董事会独立性的影响,以及董事会独立性和ceo / cfo对公司治理披露实践的交互作用。尽管世界各地都在进行公司治理(CG)改革,但研究证据表明,由于制度和公司治理体系薄弱,发展中国家的公司治理披露水平仍然很低。特别是,在东非,公司董事会作为企业治理的关键机制和董事会提名程序在很大程度上仍然不透明,并由大股东、首席执行官和首席财务官(ceo / cfo)主导,从而产生了可能对公司价值有害的机会主义行为。东非董事会提名程序/企业协调委员会制度的独特特点对监督和公司治理披露做法和合规具有影响,并要求对这一未充分探索的主题进行系统研究。假设H1:董事会规模与公司治理披露呈正相关关系。H2:董事会独立性与公司治理披露呈正相关关系。H3a: CEO在提名/薪酬委员会的存在会负向调节董事会独立性与公司治理披露之间的关系。H3b: CFO在提名/薪酬委员会的存在会负向调节董事会独立性与公司治理披露之间的关系。H3c: CEO和CFO出席提名/薪酬委员会会负向调节董事会独立性与公司治理披露之间的关系。利益相关者包括公司经理、从业人员、监管机构、政策制定者和投资者。采用普通最小二乘法(OLS)、固定效应模型和系统广义矩量法(GMM)。本研究使用由东非2007年至2017年1000家公司观测数据组成的大型手工收集数据集,开发了一个由164项条款组成的东非公司治理披露指数(CGDI)。为了验证我们的假设,本研究采用了三种分析方法,即OLS和固定效应(FE)回归以及两阶段系统GMM来解决内生性问题。我们发现,大型董事会和独立董事与更大程度的企业治理信息披露相关。我们的分析表明,CEO/CFO权力负向调节董事会独立性与公司治理披露之间的联系,这与那些拥有更强制度和公司治理体系的环境不同。因此,首席执行官和首席财务官参与薪酬或提名委员会的公司披露的CG信息较少。与金融危机时期相比,首席执行官和首席财务官对遴选委员会和薪酬委员会以及独立董事会在减少公司信息披露方面的综合影响在后金融危机时期更为明显。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Board Effect and the Moderating Role of CEOs/CFOs on Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from East Africa
Synopsis The research problem This study examines the effects of board size and board independence, as well as the interaction effect between board independence and CEOs/CFOs on corporate governance disclosure practices. Motivation Despite corporate governance (CG) reforms around the world, research evidence indicates that the levels of corporate governance disclosures (CGDs) in developing countries remain poor due to weak institutions and corporate governance systems. In particular, the corporate boards as a key mechanism of CG and the board nomination processes in East Africa remain largely opaque and dominated by majority shareholders, chief executive officers, and chief finance officers (CEOs/CFOs), giving rise to opportunistic behaviors that may be detrimental to firm value. The distinctive feature of the board nomination process/CG system in East Africa has implications for monitoring and corporate governance disclosure practices and compliance and calls for systematic research in this under-explored subject. Hypotheses H1: The association between board size and corporate governance disclosure will be positive. H2: The association between board independence and corporate governance disclosure will be positive. H3a: The presence of the CEO on the nomination/remuneration committee will negatively moderate the relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure. H3b: The presence of the CFO on the nomination/remuneration committee will negatively moderate the relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure. H3c: The presence of the CEO and CFO on the nomination/remuneration committee will negatively moderate the relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure. Target population Stakeholders including firm managers, practitioners, regulatory authorities, policymakers, and investors. Adopted methodology Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects model, and system generalized method of moments (GMM). Analyses Using a large and hand-collected dataset comprising 1000 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2017 in East Africa, this study develops a corporate governance disclosure index (CGDI) of East Africa consisting of 164 provisions. To test our hypotheses, this study adopts three analytical approaches, namely OLS and fixed-effects (FE) regressions and the two-stage system GMM to address the endogeneity concerns. Findings We find that large boards and independent directors are associated with greater disclosure of CG information. Our analysis suggests that CEO/CFO power negatively moderates the link between board independence and corporate governance disclosure, unlike those environments with stronger institutions and corporate governance systems. Thus, firms whose CEO and CFO are involved in remuneration or nomination committees disclose less CG information. The combined effect of the CEO and CFO on selection and remuneration committees and an independent board in reducing corporate disclosure appears more pronounced for the post-financial crisis period compared with the crisis period.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The aim of The International Journal of Accounting is to advance the academic and professional understanding of accounting theory, policies and practice from the international perspective and viewpoint. The Journal editorial recognizes that international accounting is influenced by a variety of forces, e.g., governmental, political and economic. Thus, the primary criterion for manuscript evaluation is the incremental contribution to international accounting literature and the forces that impact the field. The Journal aims at understanding the present and potential ability of accounting to aid in analyzing and interpreting international economic transactions and the economic consequences of such reporting. These transactions may be within a profit or non-profit environment. The Journal encourages a broad view of the origins and development of accounting with an emphasis on its functions in an increasingly interdependent global economy. The Journal also welcomes manuscripts that help explain current international accounting practices, with related theoretical justifications, and identify criticisms of current policies and practice. Other than occasional commissioned papers or special issues, all the manuscripts published in the Journal are selected by the editors after the normal double-blind refereeing process.
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