后阿克塔维斯时代延期付款协议案例调查

IF 0.4 4区 社会学 Q3 LAW
Thomas Y. Lu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2013年,美国最高法院就延期付款纠纷作出裁决,Actavis之后,延期付款协议的进一步发展是什么?我们调查了17项涉及品牌药品所有者和仿制药公司的延迟支付交易,以了解他们的交易是如何根据Actavis构建的,以及涉及此类合同的后续法庭案件的结果。因此,我们在这里假设,在我们的调查中,几乎一半的交易中都出现了无授权仿制药(AG)条款,即延迟付款协议中要求生产品牌药物的公司不要在市场上推出自己的仿制药的条款。更重要的是,我们发现,在Actavis之后的案件中,法官没有建立一个框架来分析延期付款是否数额巨大且不合理。因此,法官们无法充分解释为什么根据Actavis的理性规则测试,给定的延期付款协议可能是反竞争的。通过这些发现,我们推断药品制造商应该能够避免在其和解中不包括AG条款。最后,我们预测,如果反垄断机构和法院统一延迟付款协议的分析框架,他们将对“大额和不合理的付款”做出更有力的解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A survey of cases of the pay-for-delay agreement in the post-Actavis era
What are the further developments on pay-for-delay agreements following Actavis, the case decided by the US Supreme Court regarding a pay-for-delay dispute in 2013? We surveyed 17 pay-to-delay deals involving brand-name drug owners and generic companies to see how their deals were structured in light of Actavis, as well as the results of follow-on court cases involving such contracts. As a result, we posit here that a no-Authorized Generic (AG) provision, the clause in a pay-for-delay agreement that asks the company making the brand-name drug not to launch its own generic drug in the market, occurred in almost half of the deals in our survey. More importantly, we found that the judges in cases following Actavis did not establish a framework to analyse whether pay-for-delay payments were large and unjustified. Therefore, the judges could not adequately explain why a given pay-for-delay agreement may have been anti-competitive under the rule-of-reason test under Actavis. Through these findings, we inferred that drug manufacturers should be able to avoid including no-AG provisions in their settlements. Finally, we predicted that antitrust agencies and courts would achieve a stronger interpretation of ‘large and unjustified payments’ if they unified the analytical framework for pay-for-delay agreements.
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CiteScore
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