可靠的知识

Q2 Arts and Humanities

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI:10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03

J. Dixon

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引用次数: 7

摘要

最近，John Turri（2015b）与认识论者的正统观点相反，认为可靠性不是知识的必要条件。根据这一结果，Turri（2015a，20172016a，2019）为一种新的知识解释——称为能力论——辩护，这种解释允许不可靠的知识。我认为，图里的论点未能证明不可靠的知识是可能的，并认为图里对知识的描述是错误的，因为可靠性必须是知识的必要条件。

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Reliable Knowledge

Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.

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来源期刊

DIALECTICA PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Dialectica publishes first-rate articles predominantly in theoretical and systematic philosophy. It is edited in Switzerland and has a focus on analytical philosophy undertaken on the continent. Continuing the work of its founding members, dialectica seeks a better understanding of the mutual support between science and philosophy that both disciplines need and enjoy in their common search for understanding.