儒家自由:评估辩论

IF 0.5 2区哲学 0 ASIAN STUDIES

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-07-03 DOI:10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439

R. Carleo

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引用次数: 4

摘要

自由在儒家思想中占有什么地位?在这个问题上，我们发现了各种各样的观点:一些人否认儒家重视甚至设想自由，而另一些人则赞扬儒家独特的崇高形式的自由。本文考察了这些建议的范围，在这些不同的观点中找到了共识，因为它们都认同儒家对(i)对善的主观肯定和(ii)对与善一致的欲望和意图的培养的独特强调。儒家自由观的差异并非源于对儒家教义的不同解读。相反，他们的分歧在于肯定或否认儒家思想的这些核心方面应该被视为“自由”。这揭示了一个未被讨论的、关于儒家自由的基本问题:我们是否可以、是否应该把传统儒家的道德理想——即儒家的善和贤德——视为自由的不同版本?我们这样做有什么好处呢?

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Confucian freedom: assessing the debate

ABSTRACT What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?

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来源期刊

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY Multiple-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Asian Philosophy is an international journal concerned with such philosophical traditions as Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist and Islamic. The purpose of the journal is to bring these rich and varied traditions to a worldwide academic audience. It publishes articles in the central philosophical areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, moral and social philosophy, as well as in applied philosophical areas such as aesthetics and jurisprudence. It also publishes articles comparing Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.