增强竞赛中的等价补偿模式

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI:10.3390/g14020031

Chen Cohen, Roy Darioshi, S. Nitzan

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文给出了具有外部或内部成本补偿的图洛克增强型彩票竞赛的等价定理。研究了三种可供选择的补偿模式。这种等价性意味着，尽管增强竞争容易受到框架偏见的影响，但它在战略上是中立的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Equivalent Modes of Reimbursement in Augmented Contests

This article presents an equivalence theorem in the context of Tullock’s augmented lottery contest with external or internal cost reimbursement. Three alternative modes of reimbursement are studied. The equivalence implies that, even though the augmented contest is vulnerable to framing biases, it is strategically neutral.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.