Nihon no Gensiryoku Gaiko [Japan’s nuclear diplomacy: a resource-poor country’s 70 years of struggle]

The objective of Prof. Takeda’s new book is to describe the history of the Japanese peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although many other books with the same objective have been published since the meltdown of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, his book is distinctive because of two perspectives; the focus on Japanese diplomacy and comprehensiveness covering not only the history of peaceful use but the related history such as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Japan, the most important book in this field has been Yoshioka’s work. As the main focus of Yoshioka was understanding the Japanese domestic structure for developing of nuclear energy, Takeda’s book is another pillar of this field. In the introduction, Takeda gives a brief history of the discovery of nuclear energy and explains technical terms such as nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. With these explanations, even readers who are not familiar with the topic of peaceful use can read this book without difficulty. Chapter 1 outlines the Japanese history related to nuclear energy up to 1954, including the massive impact of the Lucky Dragon incident. This incident made Japan a three-time victim of nuclear weapons, and Japanese citizens began to feel anxious about nuclear energy itself. Japanese congressmen such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, future Japanese prime minister, planned to overwhelm those negative attitudes through cooperation with the U.S. This idea resulted in a bilateral agreement to the preliminary research of nuclear energy in 1955, and this agreement was expanded to operate a nuclear power reactor in 1958. As Takeda points out, this agreement established Japanese principles for developing nuclear energy; importing advanced technology and rushing for being a major state of peaceful use. In chapter 2, Takeda describes that the French nuclear experiments in 1960 and the Chinese experiments in 1964 made the U.S. increasingly concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, Japan was forced to consider whether Japan should participate in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Takeda suggests that Japan finally decided to be an original signatory for several reasons in 1970. First, Japan succeeded in inserting a provision about holding review conferences every 5 years. Second, Japan also succeeded to revise the bilateral agreement of 1958 to enable Japan to import more nuclear fuel. Third, the U.S. assured Japan about a so-called “nuclear umbrella.” The first half of chapter 3 covers the Japanese process of NPT ratification. According to Takeda, after clarifying a safeguarding procedure required by the NPT would not be an obstacle for the peaceful use, the Japanese government decided to ratify the NPT in 1976. In addition, Takeda mentions that even by the incident of the Japanese nuclear-powered ship “Mutsu,” which led some Japanese people to establish public movements against nuclear power plants, Japan never changed its goal of becoming a major state of peaceful use. In pursuit of this goal, Japan sought cooperation with other countries. It is very interesting to the reviewer that while Japan made the U.S. angry by trying to find another supplier of enriched uranium, Japan succeeded in cooperating with European states in plans for the reprocessing of used fuel. The second half of this chapter notes that India’s experiment in 1974 intensified the U.S. concern about the proliferation, and the U.S. began to establish an export control regime. Takeda mentions that Japan was allowed to join this regime as a supplier group