{"title":"云时代对反垄断的反思","authors":"G. Berk, A. Saxenian","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183806","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article asks how antitrust can foster innovation by examining the development of infrastructure for data processing in the cloud. We contrast Amazon Web Services' centralized model with Google Cloud Platform's more decentralized, participatory ecosystem. We argue that rather than trying to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and independent database companies, antitrust should seek to channel platforms from the centralized model toward the decentralized ecosystem by (1) making partnership more attractive than mergers and (2) enlisting open-source foundations to help manage interoperability in the cloud. This requires breaking down the silos between competition, technology, and industrial policy.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":"51 1","pages":"409 - 435"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rethinking Antitrust for the Cloud Era\",\"authors\":\"G. Berk, A. Saxenian\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00323292231183806\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article asks how antitrust can foster innovation by examining the development of infrastructure for data processing in the cloud. We contrast Amazon Web Services' centralized model with Google Cloud Platform's more decentralized, participatory ecosystem. We argue that rather than trying to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and independent database companies, antitrust should seek to channel platforms from the centralized model toward the decentralized ecosystem by (1) making partnership more attractive than mergers and (2) enlisting open-source foundations to help manage interoperability in the cloud. This requires breaking down the silos between competition, technology, and industrial policy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47847,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics & Society\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"409 - 435\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics & Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183806\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183806","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article asks how antitrust can foster innovation by examining the development of infrastructure for data processing in the cloud. We contrast Amazon Web Services' centralized model with Google Cloud Platform's more decentralized, participatory ecosystem. We argue that rather than trying to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and independent database companies, antitrust should seek to channel platforms from the centralized model toward the decentralized ecosystem by (1) making partnership more attractive than mergers and (2) enlisting open-source foundations to help manage interoperability in the cloud. This requires breaking down the silos between competition, technology, and industrial policy.
期刊介绍:
Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.