公共基础设施的私人融资

IF 5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
E. Engel, R. Fischer, Alexander Galetovic
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引用次数: 0

摘要

公私伙伴关系(ppp)已经成为提供公共基础设施的一种组织形式。公私伙伴关系的一个关键特征是私人投资者直接参与单个基础设施项目。私人融资的优势在于它可以提高激励。然而,私人资金通常既不能腾出公共资金,也不能扩大可行项目的数量。如果将外生需求风险分配给公众,而将内生风险分配给私人各方(ppp和融资者),则私人融资可以改善风险分配,这为效率提供了强大的激励。当项目的资金依赖于用户费用时,与固定期限合同相比,可变期限合同可以有效地分配风险。探索将内生风险分配给私人方的替代金融合约,并确定这些风险在借款人和贷款人之间的最佳分配,是未来研究的潜在成果领域。这条研究路线可能与基础设施融资以外的领域相关。《金融经济学年度评论》第13卷的最终在线出版日期预计为2022年11月。修订后的估计数请参阅http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Private Finance of Public Infrastructure
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an organizational form to provide public infrastructure. A key characteristic of PPPs is that private investors participate directly in individual infrastructure projects. The advantage of private finance is that it may improve incentives. However, private finance typically neither frees public funds nor enlarges the pool of viable projects. Private finance improves risk allocation if exogenous demand risk is assigned to the public, while endogenous risks are assigned to the private parties (PPPs and financiers), which provides strong incentives for efficiency. When funding for the project relies on user fees, variable term contracts can allocate risks efficiently, in contrast to allocation under fixed term contracts. The exploration of alternative financial contracts that allocate endogenous risks to private parties and determination of the optimal allocation of these risks among borrowers and lenders are potentially fruitful areas for future research. This line of research is probably relevant beyond infrastructure finance. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Financial Economics, Volume 13 is November 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
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