{"title":"现实主义：理论变革对科学现实主义形而上学的挑战","authors":"Kerry McKenzie","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Being realistic: the challenge of theory change for a metaphysics of scientific realism\",\"authors\":\"Kerry McKenzie\",\"doi\":\"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":29732,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-02-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Being realistic: the challenge of theory change for a metaphysics of scientific realism
Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.
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