网络平台质量、折扣与广告：理论分析

IF 1.7 Q3 MANAGEMENT

IIMB Management Review Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.iimb.2022.03.004

Sangita Poddar, Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee), Swapnendu Banerjee

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文讨论了双边垄断平台对购买者提供价格折扣的最优策略。该平台利用广告手段向买家传递折扣信息，同时也为买家提供服务。虽然折扣只增加了买家的效用，但由于间接网络外部性的存在，它影响了买家和卖家的每次互动价格。模型分析表明，对于垄断平台，服务质量和广告水平会随着折扣而明显降低。对垄断均衡与社会最优的比较表明，垄断平台设定的服务质量高于社会规划者。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Online platform quality, discount, and advertising: A theoretical analysis

The paper discusses the optimal strategies of a two-sided monopoly platform where the platform offers price discount to buyers. The platform uses advertising instruments to transmit information about discount to buyers and also provides service to its buyers. Although discount adds utility to buyers only, it affects per-interaction price of both buyers and sellers because of the presence of indirect network externality. The model analysis shows that service quality and level of advertisement will reduce unambiguously with discount for the monopoly platform. A comparison of monopoly equilibrium with the social optimum reveals that the monopoly platform sets higher service quality compared to the social planner.

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来源期刊

IIMB Management Review MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.90%

发文量

审稿时长

68 days

期刊介绍： IIMB Management Review (IMR) is a quarterly journal brought out by the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. Addressed to management practitioners, researchers and academics, IMR aims to engage rigorously with practices, concepts and ideas in the field of management, with an emphasis on providing managerial insights, in a reader friendly format. To this end IMR invites manuscripts that provide novel managerial insights in any of the core business functions. The manuscript should be rigorous, that is, the findings should be supported by either empirical data or a well-justified theoretical model, and well written. While these two requirements are necessary for acceptance, they do not guarantee acceptance. The sole criterion for publication is contribution to the extant management literature.Although all manuscripts are welcome, our special emphasis is on papers that focus on emerging economies throughout the world. Such papers may either improve our understanding of markets in such economies through novel analyses or build models by taking into account the special characteristics of such economies to provide guidance to managers.