{"title":"躲避谁?","authors":"Ksenia Ermoshina, F. Musiani","doi":"10.7202/1058473AR","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Following Edward Snowden’s revelations, end-to-end encryption is becoming increasingly widespread in messaging tools—solutions that propose a large variety of ways to conceal, obfuscate, disguise private communications and online activities. Designing privacy-enhancing tools requires the identification of a threat model that serves to agree upon an appropriate threshold of anonymity and confidentiality for a particular context of usage. In this article, we discuss different use-cases, from “nothing-to-hide” low-risk situations to high-risk scenarios in war zones or in authoritarian contexts, to question how users, trainers, and developers co-construct threat models, decide which data to conceal, and how to conceal it. We demonstrate that classic oppositions such as high-risk versus low-risk, privacy versus security, should be redefined within a more relational, processual, and contextual approach.","PeriodicalId":42444,"journal":{"name":"Intermedialites","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.7202/1058473AR","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hiding from Whom?\",\"authors\":\"Ksenia Ermoshina, F. Musiani\",\"doi\":\"10.7202/1058473AR\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Following Edward Snowden’s revelations, end-to-end encryption is becoming increasingly widespread in messaging tools—solutions that propose a large variety of ways to conceal, obfuscate, disguise private communications and online activities. Designing privacy-enhancing tools requires the identification of a threat model that serves to agree upon an appropriate threshold of anonymity and confidentiality for a particular context of usage. In this article, we discuss different use-cases, from “nothing-to-hide” low-risk situations to high-risk scenarios in war zones or in authoritarian contexts, to question how users, trainers, and developers co-construct threat models, decide which data to conceal, and how to conceal it. We demonstrate that classic oppositions such as high-risk versus low-risk, privacy versus security, should be redefined within a more relational, processual, and contextual approach.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42444,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Intermedialites\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.7202/1058473AR\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Intermedialites\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7202/1058473AR\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Intermedialites","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1058473AR","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Following Edward Snowden’s revelations, end-to-end encryption is becoming increasingly widespread in messaging tools—solutions that propose a large variety of ways to conceal, obfuscate, disguise private communications and online activities. Designing privacy-enhancing tools requires the identification of a threat model that serves to agree upon an appropriate threshold of anonymity and confidentiality for a particular context of usage. In this article, we discuss different use-cases, from “nothing-to-hide” low-risk situations to high-risk scenarios in war zones or in authoritarian contexts, to question how users, trainers, and developers co-construct threat models, decide which data to conceal, and how to conceal it. We demonstrate that classic oppositions such as high-risk versus low-risk, privacy versus security, should be redefined within a more relational, processual, and contextual approach.