解决公私伙伴关系(PPP)采购中的逆向选择:基于代理的方法

IF 1 Q3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
V. Vecchi, Niccolò Cusumano, Carter B. Casady, S. Gatti, E. Borgonovo
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引用次数: 4

摘要

在高风险的公私合作项目中,政府和公共机构倾向于为私人投资者的参与提供一定的担保。然而,当公共部门能力和制度薄弱时,这些担保可能会在招标过程中产生道德风险,导致合同重新谈判,从而给纳税人带来损失。本文利用一个复杂的、基于代理的模型,再现了PPP采购过程的复杂动态,证明了在PPP项目中提供担保时,公共部门的能力对于限制道德风险至关重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Addressing Adverse Selection in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Procurement: An Agent-Based Approach
In risky public-private partnership (PPP) projects, governments and public institutions tend to offer private investors certain guarantees for their participation. However, when public sector capacity and institutions are weak, these guarantees can generate moral hazard in the bidding process and lead to contractual renegotiations, resulting in a loss for taxpayers. Drawing on a sophisticated, agent-based model that recreates the complex dynamics of the PPP procurement process, this paper demonstrates public sector competency is crucial for limiting moral hazard when guarantees are offered in PPP projects.
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来源期刊
Public Works Management & Policy
Public Works Management & Policy PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN TRANSPORTATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT is a peer-reviewed journal for academics and practitioners in public works and the public and private infrastructure industries. This journal addresses the planning, financing, development, and operations of civil infrastructure systems at all levels of society— from federal policy to the demand for, and delivery of, state and local public works services. PWMP solicits manuscripts that convey research results, evaluate management innovations, suggest methods of analysis and evaluation, and examine policy issues.
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