{"title":"康德反民主案","authors":"Alon Harel","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2022.2133828","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Contrary to what Cordelli argues, the relationship between Kantian legitimacy and democratic decision-making is contingent rather than necessary. This paper counters the connection between Kantian legitimacy and democracy in three ways: by arguing that democratic authorization is (i) not necessary, (ii) not sufficient, and indeed may be (iii) detrimental to, legitimate governance.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Kantian case against democracy\",\"authors\":\"Alon Harel\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13698230.2022.2133828\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Contrary to what Cordelli argues, the relationship between Kantian legitimacy and democratic decision-making is contingent rather than necessary. This paper counters the connection between Kantian legitimacy and democracy in three ways: by arguing that democratic authorization is (i) not necessary, (ii) not sufficient, and indeed may be (iii) detrimental to, legitimate governance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46451,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2133828\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2133828","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Contrary to what Cordelli argues, the relationship between Kantian legitimacy and democratic decision-making is contingent rather than necessary. This paper counters the connection between Kantian legitimacy and democracy in three ways: by arguing that democratic authorization is (i) not necessary, (ii) not sufficient, and indeed may be (iii) detrimental to, legitimate governance.