在核首次使用事件后保留核禁忌:核伦理分析

Q2 Social Sciences
T. E. Doyle
{"title":"在核首次使用事件后保留核禁忌:核伦理分析","authors":"T. E. Doyle","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to Nina Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo is a deeply held moral norm against the first use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear taboo is violated by a country engaging in nuclear first use, how might the taboo be preserved and nuclear restraint restored? An analysis contrasting the logic of nuclear deterrence with the logic of the nuclear taboo offers reasons why the nuclear taboo cannot be preserved if the response to nuclear first use is nuclear reprisal. Instead, the preservation of the nuclear taboo would require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and conventional military responses. Nuclear reprisal might restore nuclear deterrence, but it would also validate the role of nuclear weapons in national or alliance security policy. Taboo enforcement cannot rely on the very behaviors the taboo prohibits.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"131 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Preserving the nuclear taboo after a nuclear first-use event: a nuclear ethical analysis\",\"authors\":\"T. E. Doyle\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT According to Nina Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo is a deeply held moral norm against the first use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear taboo is violated by a country engaging in nuclear first use, how might the taboo be preserved and nuclear restraint restored? An analysis contrasting the logic of nuclear deterrence with the logic of the nuclear taboo offers reasons why the nuclear taboo cannot be preserved if the response to nuclear first use is nuclear reprisal. Instead, the preservation of the nuclear taboo would require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and conventional military responses. Nuclear reprisal might restore nuclear deterrence, but it would also validate the role of nuclear weapons in national or alliance security policy. Taboo enforcement cannot rely on the very behaviors the taboo prohibits.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35157,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Nonproliferation Review\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"131 - 148\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Nonproliferation Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nonproliferation Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要妮娜·坦南瓦尔德认为,核禁忌是反对首次使用核武器的一种根深蒂固的道德规范。如果一个首先使用核武器的国家违反了核禁忌,该如何维护禁忌并恢复核克制?一项将核威慑逻辑与核禁忌逻辑进行对比的分析提供了如果对首次使用核武器的反应是核报复,那么就不能保留核禁忌的原因。相反,维护核禁忌需要外交、经济和常规军事回应相结合。核报复可能会恢复核威慑,但也会验证核武器在国家或联盟安全政策中的作用。禁忌的执行不能依赖于禁忌所禁止的行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Preserving the nuclear taboo after a nuclear first-use event: a nuclear ethical analysis
ABSTRACT According to Nina Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo is a deeply held moral norm against the first use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear taboo is violated by a country engaging in nuclear first use, how might the taboo be preserved and nuclear restraint restored? An analysis contrasting the logic of nuclear deterrence with the logic of the nuclear taboo offers reasons why the nuclear taboo cannot be preserved if the response to nuclear first use is nuclear reprisal. Instead, the preservation of the nuclear taboo would require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and conventional military responses. Nuclear reprisal might restore nuclear deterrence, but it would also validate the role of nuclear weapons in national or alliance security policy. Taboo enforcement cannot rely on the very behaviors the taboo prohibits.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信