{"title":"数字时代的成熟理论:何时退出网络冲突","authors":"Alexandria Polk","doi":"10.1163/15718069-bja10048","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nWhen are cyber conflicts ripe for negotiation? Analysis of cyber conflict presents a challenge to the prevailing negotiation concept, Zartman’s ripeness theory. Ripeness theory posits that the timing of a negotiation stems from the conflicting parties’ perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) and “a way out” of conflict through dialogue. While this theory has shown merit for negotiations related to conventional warfare or economic disputes, there are gaps in its applicability for resolving cyber conflict. Specifically, the concept of a “hurting stalemate” has little to no presence in cyber disputes, rendering MHS incompatible with pure cyber negotiations. As such, redefining mutually hurting stalemate for cyber conflict is paramount to address this discrepancy. Examining the 2015 bilateral US-China Cybersecurity Agreement provides a context for applying our hypothesis and demonstrates how accepted negotiation theory may be applied to cyber conflict.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ripeness Theory in the Digital Age: When to Log Off from Cyber Conflict\",\"authors\":\"Alexandria Polk\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/15718069-bja10048\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nWhen are cyber conflicts ripe for negotiation? Analysis of cyber conflict presents a challenge to the prevailing negotiation concept, Zartman’s ripeness theory. Ripeness theory posits that the timing of a negotiation stems from the conflicting parties’ perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) and “a way out” of conflict through dialogue. While this theory has shown merit for negotiations related to conventional warfare or economic disputes, there are gaps in its applicability for resolving cyber conflict. Specifically, the concept of a “hurting stalemate” has little to no presence in cyber disputes, rendering MHS incompatible with pure cyber negotiations. As such, redefining mutually hurting stalemate for cyber conflict is paramount to address this discrepancy. Examining the 2015 bilateral US-China Cybersecurity Agreement provides a context for applying our hypothesis and demonstrates how accepted negotiation theory may be applied to cyber conflict.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45224,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10048\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10048","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Ripeness Theory in the Digital Age: When to Log Off from Cyber Conflict
When are cyber conflicts ripe for negotiation? Analysis of cyber conflict presents a challenge to the prevailing negotiation concept, Zartman’s ripeness theory. Ripeness theory posits that the timing of a negotiation stems from the conflicting parties’ perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) and “a way out” of conflict through dialogue. While this theory has shown merit for negotiations related to conventional warfare or economic disputes, there are gaps in its applicability for resolving cyber conflict. Specifically, the concept of a “hurting stalemate” has little to no presence in cyber disputes, rendering MHS incompatible with pure cyber negotiations. As such, redefining mutually hurting stalemate for cyber conflict is paramount to address this discrepancy. Examining the 2015 bilateral US-China Cybersecurity Agreement provides a context for applying our hypothesis and demonstrates how accepted negotiation theory may be applied to cyber conflict.
期刊介绍:
International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice examines negotiation from many perspectives, to explore its theoretical foundations and to promote its practical application. It addresses the processes of negotiation relating to political, security, environmental, ethnic, economic, business, legal, scientific and cultural issues and conflicts among nations, international and regional organisations, multinational corporations and other non-state parties. Conceptually, the Journal confronts the difficult task of developing interdisciplinary theories and models of the negotiation process and its desired outcome.