扩张还是抑制：所有者和被提名董事在财务困境中的作用

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Emerging Market Finance Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI:10.1177/09726527231183014

Swechha Chada, Sumit Banerjee

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了印度不同公司层面的公司治理机制对财务困境可能性的影响。我们分析了利益一致性和代理理论的竞争性假设，考察了控股股东如何影响财务困境的概率。此外，我们还评估了机构投资者持股和银行任命董事对财务困境可能性的潜在影响。我们的研究结果表明，增加控股股东的所有权可以降低陷入困境的可能性。然而，机构投资者和银行任命董事的影响各不相同，而且还取决于机构投资者的持股量和与商业集团的隶属关系。我们的研究结果为改善所有权集中度较高、制度框架较弱、银行参与信贷便利化程度较高的经济体的治理提供了见解。JEL代码:G32, G33, G34

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Stretch or Suppress: Role of Owners and Nominee Directors in Financial Distress

This study investigates the effect of various firm-level corporate governance mechanisms on the likelihood of financial distress in India. We analyze the competing hypotheses of interest alignment and agency theory, examining how controlling shareholders affect the probability of financial distress. Additionally, we assess the potential impact of institutional investor shareholding and bank-appointed directors on the likelihood of financial distress. Our findings suggest that increasing controlling shareholder ownership decreases the probability of distress. However, the effects of institutional investors and bank-appointed directors vary and also depend on the quantum of shareholding of institutional investors and affiliation with business groups. Our results offer insights into improving governance in economies with higher ownership concentration, weaker institutional frameworks, and greater bank participation in credit facilitation. JEL Codes: G32, G33, G34

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来源期刊

Journal of Emerging Market Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

33.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Emerging Market Finance is a forum for debate and discussion on the theory and practice of finance in emerging markets. While the emphasis is on articles that are of practical significance, the journal also covers theoretical and conceptual aspects relating to emerging financial markets. Peer-reviewed, the journal is equally useful to practitioners and to banking and investment companies as to scholars.