{"title":"对凯尔森对亚里士多德正义观批判的回应","authors":"A. C. Prado","doi":"10.25100/PFILOSOFICA.V0I48.7303","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Kelsen wrote a book, much less known than his Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law), called Was ist Gerechtigkeit (What is Justice), in which he attempts to show how and why several theories of justice, formulated by authors ranging from Greece to European Illuminism, are wrong. One of those concepts is Aristotle’s, as exposed in his Nichomachean Ethics. In this article, I argue that in order to show Aristotle wrong, Kelsen misinterprets his theory, then ignores the practical consequences it implies. I attempt to demonstrate that, although highly influenced by the (retrograde) mores of his time, Aristotle’s theory can be useful to us today, which Kelsen denies. Finally, I present a challenge regarding one point raised by Kelsen which is particularly hard to reply.","PeriodicalId":32513,"journal":{"name":"Praxis Filosofica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A reply to Kelsen's critique of Aristotle's concept of justice\",\"authors\":\"A. C. Prado\",\"doi\":\"10.25100/PFILOSOFICA.V0I48.7303\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Kelsen wrote a book, much less known than his Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law), called Was ist Gerechtigkeit (What is Justice), in which he attempts to show how and why several theories of justice, formulated by authors ranging from Greece to European Illuminism, are wrong. One of those concepts is Aristotle’s, as exposed in his Nichomachean Ethics. In this article, I argue that in order to show Aristotle wrong, Kelsen misinterprets his theory, then ignores the practical consequences it implies. I attempt to demonstrate that, although highly influenced by the (retrograde) mores of his time, Aristotle’s theory can be useful to us today, which Kelsen denies. Finally, I present a challenge regarding one point raised by Kelsen which is particularly hard to reply.\",\"PeriodicalId\":32513,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Praxis Filosofica\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Praxis Filosofica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.25100/PFILOSOFICA.V0I48.7303\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Praxis Filosofica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25100/PFILOSOFICA.V0I48.7303","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
凯尔森写了一本书,比他的《纯粹法律理论》(Reine Rechtslehre)鲜为人知,名为《正义是什么》(Was ist Gerechtigkeit),在这本书中,他试图说明从希腊到欧洲光明会的作者们所提出的几种正义理论是如何以及为什么是错误的。其中一个概念是亚里士多德的,在他的《尼各马可伦理学》中有所揭示。在本文中,我认为,为了证明亚里士多德是错误的,凯尔森误解了他的理论,然后忽视了它所隐含的实际后果。我试图证明,尽管受到他那个时代(逆行的)习俗的高度影响,亚里士多德的理论对今天的我们仍然有用,而凯尔森否认了这一点。最后,我对Kelsen提出的一个特别难以回答的观点提出了挑战。
A reply to Kelsen's critique of Aristotle's concept of justice
Kelsen wrote a book, much less known than his Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law), called Was ist Gerechtigkeit (What is Justice), in which he attempts to show how and why several theories of justice, formulated by authors ranging from Greece to European Illuminism, are wrong. One of those concepts is Aristotle’s, as exposed in his Nichomachean Ethics. In this article, I argue that in order to show Aristotle wrong, Kelsen misinterprets his theory, then ignores the practical consequences it implies. I attempt to demonstrate that, although highly influenced by the (retrograde) mores of his time, Aristotle’s theory can be useful to us today, which Kelsen denies. Finally, I present a challenge regarding one point raised by Kelsen which is particularly hard to reply.