排他性交易的需求刺激理论

IF 2.8 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-24 DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12338

G. Calzolari, V. Denicoló, Piercarlo Zanchettin

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引用次数: 14

摘要

本文统一了迄今为止被认为泾渭分明的分析排他性交易的各种方法。这些方法的共同要素是企业偏离有效定价，将边际价格提高到边际成本之上。我们证明，在扭曲价格的情况下，只要占主导地位的企业对竞争对手享有强大的竞争优势，排他性交易可以直接获利，而且是反竞争的。占主导地位的公司直接获利，而不是在未来或邻近市场获利，这要归功于当买家签订排他性合同时，它所享受的需求增长。我们讨论了该理论对反垄断政策的启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The demand‐boost theory of exclusive dealing

This paper unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing,raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anti-competitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a strong competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.

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来源期刊

Rand Journal of Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.60

自引率

4.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.