{"title":"对抗的极限:核武器、1958年台湾海峡危机与中美关系","authors":"Xuegong Zhao","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01144","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract During the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Eisenhower administration used nuclear weapons to deter Chinese shelling of the Quemoy islands. Zhao claims that the oblique nuclear threats had no effect on Beijing's decisions and operations and instead created problems for the Eisenhower administration by generating widespread opposition at home and abroad. Based on recently declassified U.S. and Chinese materials, this article examines U.S. and Chinese leaders’ perspectives on nuclear weapons during the crisis and other features of U.S.-China relations in the late 1950s.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Limits of Confrontation: Nuclear Weapons, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and China-U.S. Relations\",\"authors\":\"Xuegong Zhao\",\"doi\":\"10.1162/jcws_a_01144\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract During the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Eisenhower administration used nuclear weapons to deter Chinese shelling of the Quemoy islands. Zhao claims that the oblique nuclear threats had no effect on Beijing's decisions and operations and instead created problems for the Eisenhower administration by generating widespread opposition at home and abroad. Based on recently declassified U.S. and Chinese materials, this article examines U.S. and Chinese leaders’ perspectives on nuclear weapons during the crisis and other features of U.S.-China relations in the late 1950s.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45551,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Cold War Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Cold War Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01144\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cold War Studies","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01144","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Limits of Confrontation: Nuclear Weapons, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and China-U.S. Relations
Abstract During the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Eisenhower administration used nuclear weapons to deter Chinese shelling of the Quemoy islands. Zhao claims that the oblique nuclear threats had no effect on Beijing's decisions and operations and instead created problems for the Eisenhower administration by generating widespread opposition at home and abroad. Based on recently declassified U.S. and Chinese materials, this article examines U.S. and Chinese leaders’ perspectives on nuclear weapons during the crisis and other features of U.S.-China relations in the late 1950s.