基于核安全系列的实物保护系统、纠正措施和弱点识别:假想原子研究所(HARI)案例

Q4 Social Sciences
Ouadie Kabach, A. Chetaine, A. Benchrif
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引用次数: 1

摘要

该论文基于国际原子能机构的核安全系列(NSS),试图确定假想原子研究所(HARI)材料试验堆(MTR)设施的物理保护系统(PPS)的任何不可接受的功能障碍。对现有或拟议PPS的评估需要一种有条不紊的方法,通过这种方法,应衡量安全系统满足既定保护目标的能力,以防止破坏和盗窃的可能性。如果没有这种仔细的评估,PPS可能会将宝贵的资源浪费在不必要的保护上,或者更糟的是,无法在设施的关键点提供足够的保护。在这项工作中,对针对恶意行为的假设设施的PPS弱点进行了评估。因此,这些弱点是在对现场进行检查以建立3D计算机模拟来模拟部队交战以评估物理保护系统有效性的过程中发现的。在原子能机构核安全系列出版物的基础上,该文件提出了一种新的布局来纠正漏洞,并对MTR壁厚出入控制和重新设计的建筑计划的变化进行了另一次分析。1 Kabach:实物保护系统、纠正措施和弱点Id国际核安全杂志,2020年第6卷第1期
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Physical Protection System, Corrective Actions, and Weaknesses Identification Based on Nuclear Security Series: The Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) Case
The paper is an attempt, based on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series (NSS), to identify any unacceptable dysfunction of physical protection system (PPS) of the Material Test Reactor (MTR) facility in a Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI). The evaluation of an existing or a proposed PPS requires a methodical approach whereby the ability of the security system to meet defined protection goals as the safeguard against the possibility of sabotage and theft should be measured. Without this kind of careful assessment, the PPS might waste valuable resources on unnecessary protection or, worse yet, fail to provide adequate protection at critical points of the facility. In this work, an assessment of the PPS weaknesses for a hypothetical facility against malicious acts is presented. Hence, those weaknesses are founded during the examination of the site to build a 3D computerized simulation to simulate force engagement to evaluate the physical protection system effectiveness. Based on the IAEA nuclear security series publications, the paper proposes a new layout to correct the vulnerabilities, and another analysis of the changes made for the MTR wall thicknesses access control and the redesigned building plan. 1 Kabach: Physical Protection System, Corrective Actions, and Weaknesses Id International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2020
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来源期刊
International Journal of Nuclear Security
International Journal of Nuclear Security Social Sciences-Safety Research
CiteScore
0.50
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