A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics

Abstract Many have pointed out that the utility of mathematical objects is somewhat disconnected from their ontological status. For example, one might argue that arithmetic is useful whether or not numbers exist. We explore this phenomenon in the context of Divine Conceptualism (DC), which claims that mathematical objects exist as thoughts in the divine mind. While not arguing against DC claims, we argue that DC claims can lead to epistemological uncertainty regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects. This weakens DC attempts to explain the utility of mathematical objects on the basis of their existence. To address this weakness, we propose an appeal to Liggins’ theory of Belief Expressionism (BE). Indeed, we point out that BE is amenable to the ontological claims of DC while also explaining the utility of mathematical objects apart from reliance upon their existence. We illustrate these themes via a case study of Peano Arithmetic.