“MAKE”的密码分析

IF 0.5 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1515/jmc-2021-0016

Daniel R. L. Brown, N. Koblitz, Jason Legrow

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引用次数: 10

摘要

摘要Rahman和Shpillain在有限域上基于n×。我们证明，使用公共信息，对手可以通过求解一个n2{n}^{2}线性方程组来恢复商定的密钥。

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Cryptanalysis of “MAKE”

Abstract Rahman and Shpilrain proposed a Diffie–Hellman style key exchange based on a semidirect product of n × n n\times n -matrices over a finite field. We show that, using public information, an adversary can recover the agreed upon secret key by solving a system of n 2 {n}^{2} linear equations.

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS-

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

8.30%

发文量

审稿时长

100 weeks