{"title":"影响强制执行:国际法在独立司法中的适用——以《外国人侵权法》为例","authors":"A. B. Bayram, Banks Miller","doi":"10.1177/10659129231185596","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What explains the variation in the interpretation and enforcement of international law by domestic judges? Can independent judiciaries control the enforcement of countries’ commitments to international law? In this paper, we leverage a unique source of data—cases related to the Alien Tort Statute—to investigate how independent judges might be able to enforce international commitments to human rights without concern for whether the state (here the United States) has opted into the commitments in the first place. We show that behavioral factors in judicial decision making, and particularly those related to judicial ideological preferences, are potent predictors of judicial enforcement of international law. This implies that states with highly independent judiciaries are right to be worried about their abilities to control enforcement domestically, although we also find evidence that the U.S. government get a special degree of deference in these cases.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Influencing Enforcement: The Application of International Law in Independent Judiciaries—The Case of the Alien Tort Statute\",\"authors\":\"A. B. Bayram, Banks Miller\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10659129231185596\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What explains the variation in the interpretation and enforcement of international law by domestic judges? Can independent judiciaries control the enforcement of countries’ commitments to international law? In this paper, we leverage a unique source of data—cases related to the Alien Tort Statute—to investigate how independent judges might be able to enforce international commitments to human rights without concern for whether the state (here the United States) has opted into the commitments in the first place. We show that behavioral factors in judicial decision making, and particularly those related to judicial ideological preferences, are potent predictors of judicial enforcement of international law. This implies that states with highly independent judiciaries are right to be worried about their abilities to control enforcement domestically, although we also find evidence that the U.S. government get a special degree of deference in these cases.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51366,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Research Quarterly\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Research Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231185596\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231185596","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Influencing Enforcement: The Application of International Law in Independent Judiciaries—The Case of the Alien Tort Statute
What explains the variation in the interpretation and enforcement of international law by domestic judges? Can independent judiciaries control the enforcement of countries’ commitments to international law? In this paper, we leverage a unique source of data—cases related to the Alien Tort Statute—to investigate how independent judges might be able to enforce international commitments to human rights without concern for whether the state (here the United States) has opted into the commitments in the first place. We show that behavioral factors in judicial decision making, and particularly those related to judicial ideological preferences, are potent predictors of judicial enforcement of international law. This implies that states with highly independent judiciaries are right to be worried about their abilities to control enforcement domestically, although we also find evidence that the U.S. government get a special degree of deference in these cases.
期刊介绍:
Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.