The Afghanistan File

The Afghanistan File is a first-hand account of Saudi Arabia’s involvement with the Mujahideen during and after the Afghan-Soviet War by Prince Turki AlFaisal AlSaud and Michael Field. The son of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (1906–1975), Prince Turki served as head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) for 24 years from 1977 to 2001 and later served as Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom and United States. Prince Turki explains that during his time as GID head, ‘almost’ the entire time he was ‘above all’ focused on Afghanistan (p. xvii). He credits King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1924–2015), then a crown prince, with the idea for writing the memoir, quoting him as commenting that people in other countries gave their perspectives but there was no Saudi book to rebut false claims about Saudi Arabia. Beyond Prince Turki’s memories, the books also draw on other figures who were interviewed for the book, including former Afghan and Saudi intelligence officers. Prince Turki sees his intelligence work on Afghanistan consisting of three phases. The first is Saudi Arabia, through the GID, aiding the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1992. Most of the book is centred around this subject with Prince Turki detailing his travels, interactions, and specific meetings with Afghani, American, Pakistani and Saudi leaders as well as others, such as his ‘former press adviser’ Jamal Khashoggi (1958–2018) (who is also thanked in the acknowledgements). The book begins with Prince Turki describing the day the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the conversations he held with other governments. Notably, Pakistan was particularly concerned about the Soviet Union also occupying parts of Pakistan and the impact of an India-friendly government in Kabul. He details, for example, meeting the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan (1924–1988), in Riyadh during 1980 and days later Saudi Arabia sending $2 million in cash to the Pakistani government to be spent ‘as it wished’ (p. 6). Subsequently, American officials, at the insistence of Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), worked with Prince Turki and other Saudi officials to match funds for the resistance and purchase weapons. Prince Turki also describes aspects of Saudi bureaucratic culture, writing: ‘It tends to be the Kingdom’s policy to have just one department and one small team of people around the head of that department handling any particular issue’ (p. 12). He further notes that he authorized ‘every payment’ made by the GID and how the selection of a spokesperson for the Mujahideen came from his orders of putting the leaders in a conference room and forcing them to speak with a single voice. The total sum tallied for Saudi government expenditures to the Mujahideen was $2.71 billion, not including private donations.