现代主义与通道

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
Paul R. Daniels
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引用次数: 1

摘要

根据现在时论者的观点,只有当下存在,而随着时间的流逝,当下的东西也会发生变化。然而,一些人认为,如果只存在一个时刻,现在论者无法解释时间的流逝。虽然现在主义者在历史上求助于代理人——存在于现在,但扮演着不存在的过去的角色的代理人——来逃避这种担忧,但对代理人的呼吁遭到了丽莎·莱宁格(Lisa Leininger)的新一轮攻击。但对于现在主义者来说,希望并没有丧失。我认为,现在的人确实有资源来解决莱宁格所阐述的潜在问题。此外,存在主义者对于哪一种存在主义是最好的存在主义也存在分歧。例如,大卫·英格拉姆(David Ingram)最近提出,这种存在主义比其他版本的存在主义更可取,因为它能够处理某些其他版本的存在主义无法解决的问题。然而,我认为这种评估为时过早。更具体地说,我认为英格拉姆对丽莎·莱宁格(Lisa Leininger)反对意见的回应未能解决她提出的核心问题。因此,我认为,现在还不应该接受这种现在主义。通过这种方式,我在这里的目的是:强化莱宁格的反对意见,强调站得住脚的现在主义对此的回应,并推进关于应该支持哪种版本的现在主义的讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Presentism & Passage
Abstract According to the presentist, only the present moment exists and, as time passes, what’s present changes. However some argue that, if only one moment exists, the presentist cannot explain the passage of time. While the presentist historically appeals to surrogates—proxies which exist in the present but play the role of non-existent past times—to evade this sort of worry, the appeal to surrogates has come under renewed attack from Lisa Leininger. But hope is not lost for the presentist. I argue that presentists do have the resources available to address the underlying issue Leininger articulates. Moreover, there’s disagreement amongst presentists about which version of presentism is best. For instance, David Ingram has recently argued that thisness presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism because it’s able to handle certain problems other versions of presentism cannot. However, I argue that this assessment is premature. More specifically, I argue that Ingram’s response to an objection from Lisa Leininger fails to address the core issue she raises. Consequently, I argue that presentists shouldn’t embrace thisness presentism just yet. In this way, my aims here are to: sharpen Leininger’s objection, highlight tenable presentist replies to it, and advance the discussion about which version of presentism should be favoured.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
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