Fourteen years of cube attacks

Algebraic Cryptanalysis is a widely used technique that tackles the problem of breaking ciphers mainly relying on the ability to express a cryptosystem as a solvable polynomial system. Each output bit/word can be expressed as a polynomial equation in the cipher’s inputs—namely the key and the plaintext or the initialisation vector bits/words. A part of research in this area consists in finding suitable algebraic structures where polynomial systems can be effectively solved, e.g., by computing Gröbner bases. In 2009, Dinur and Shamir proposed the cube attack, a chosen plaintext algebraic cryptanalysis technique for the offline acquisition of an equivalent system by means of monomial reduction; interpolation on cubes in the space of variables enables retrieving a linear polynomial system, hence making it exploitable in the online phase to recover the secret key. Since its introduction, this attack has received both many criticisms and endorsements from the crypto community; this work aims at providing, under a unified notation, a complete state-of-the-art review of recent developments by categorising contributions in five classes. We conclude the work with an in-depth description of the kite attack framework, a cipher-independent tool that implements cube attacks on GPUs. Mickey2.0 is adopted as a showcase.