达尔文选择主义的解释，激进的理论变化，以及可观察和不可观察的二分法

IF 0.7 2区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-10-02 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2022.2092824

E. Shech

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引用次数: 2

摘要

在他2018年出版的新书《抵制科学现实主义》中，K. Brad Wray对科学的反现实主义进行了详细而全面的辩护。在本文中，我反对构成雷的积极和新颖的论点的两个主要主张，即他对科学成功的达尔文选择主义解释和他对基于激进理论变化的不可观察现象的怀疑。不过，我的目标并不完全是消极的。相反，我的目标是确定像Wray这样的反现实主义者需要进行的工作类型，以便进一步证实他们的立场，即采取归纳推理和支持的立场，以及似乎可行的现实主义和反现实主义立场的类型。

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Darwinian-Selectionist Explanation, Radical Theory Change, and the Observable-Unobservable Dichotomy

ABSTRACT In his recent 2018 book, Resisting Scientific Realism, K. Brad Wray provides a detailed, full-fledged defense of anti-realism about science. In this paper, I argue against the two main claims that constitute Wray’s positive and novel argument for his position, viz., his suggested Darwinian-selectionist explanation of the success of science and his skepticism about unobservables based on radical theory change. My goal is not wholly negative though. Instead, I aim to identify the type of work that an anti-realist like Wray would need to undertake in order to further substantiate their position, viz., taking a stance on inductive inference and support, and the type of realist and anti-realist positions that seem viable.

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来源期刊

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.