Addressing knowledge gaps in Indian Ocean studies

China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) –a strategy dictated and driven by a complex mix of global ambitions and domestic compulsions– continues to invite the critical attention of both scholars and practitioners in different parts of the globe, including South Asia (Doshi, 2021; Mulmi, 2021; Wolf, 2020). The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (JIOR) has published empirically rich and theoretically robust contributions over the years, that provide fresh insights on the intriguing intersections of ‘maritime connectivity’, and steadily unfolding geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic trends in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. We are pleased to note that our special issue of the JIOR published earlier this year (volume 17, issue 1, 2021) on India China rivalry and its implications for small and medium-sized states in the Indian Ocean region, including South Asia, edited by Amit Ranjan and Alan Bloomfield (2021), has been well received by our readers and the wider academic community. In the current edition of the JIOR, the theme of geostrategic competition between China and India is revisited from another important perspective adding to our multifaceted examination of this crucial subject. In the article by Ahmed and Sheikh, the authors focus on the intersection of domestic and geopolitical factors, critically examining the multifaceted and multiscalar implications of BRI for ‘regional stability’ in South Asia; a relatively neglected theme in bourgeoning literature on various – often competing – connectivity narratives contesting for greater visibility and salience. The authors forcefully argue that South Asian regionalism is negatively impacted by the geostrategic competition between the two neighboring Asian powers, as China aggressively seeks to tilt the regional balance of power in its favor by facilitating the creation of new geopolitical options for its new ‘partners’, and thereby lessen their dependence on India. Citing China’s full control of the deep seaports (e.g. Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan) as one of the examples, the authors show how geoeconomics (i.e. investments under BRI) is being deployed as a tool of geopolitics. In their assessment, Beijing’s growing engagement with a variety of political actors in the selected countries, has not aimed at influencing domestic politics yet. This contribution is yet another excellent example of how empirically detailed and theoretically informed case studies can provide valuable insights on India–China competition and its wide-ranging implications for the people and politics of the subcontinent. Parallel to –and often entangled with– the major power struggles that feed into, and in return are fed by, mutualmistrust and deeply entrenched fear of zero-sum outcomes, are the hope generating narratives of new imaginations of ecologically sustainable and commonly secured futures for all in the Indian Ocean region –and the wider Indo-Pacific– through a peaceful, cooperative, rule abiding, and inclusive maritime order from below. This vision is also embodied in the mandate and the mission of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), announced by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 14th East Asia Summit on 4 November 2019 at Bangkok, has seven pillars: maritime ecology, maritime security, marine resources, capacity building and resource sharing, disaster risk reduction and management, science, technology and academic cooperation, trade, connectivity andmaritime transport.