基于代理的机制设计——研究预算背景下的有限理性概念

IF 1.6 Q3 MANAGEMENT
Iris Lorscheid, M. Meyer
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本研究旨在展示基于主体的仿真(ABS)如何为使用有限理性(BR)概念的机制设计提供计算测试平台。ABS可用于系统地推导和形式化BR的不同模型。这使我们能够确定机制所打算的行为的认知先决条件,从而得出机制设计的含义。设计/方法/方法基于对决策上下文需求的分析,作者描述了一种将不同的BR概念纳入智能体学习模型的系统方法。通过分析预算环境中建议的真实报告激励方案来说明这种方法,这是一种改编的格罗夫斯机制方案。该研究描述了系统的方法,在这些方法中,为行为方面可能重要的研究问题派生BR代理。作者表明,BR概念可能导致其他结果,而不是预期的真相诱导效应。就预期的效果而言,将机制修改为更加可区分的支付水平可以改善结果。研究的局限性/启示目前的智能体模型模拟的BR概念不能完全模拟人类行为的复杂性。对复杂人类行为的简化是一种有用的分析结构,可以对人类行为的某些方面进行控制分析,并了解这些方面对机制设计的潜在影响。提出了一种基于BR概念的机构设计计算试验台的思想。除此之外,还展示了一种系统的、逐步的方法来形式化基于需求分析的代理的有限理性行为,包括用于比较和评估BR概念的基准模型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Agent-based mechanism design – investigating bounded rationality concepts in a budgeting context
Purpose This study aims to demonstrate how agent-based simulation (ABS) may provide a computational testbed for mechanism design using concepts of bounded rationality (BR). ABS can be used to systematically derive and formalize different models of BR. This allows us to identify the cognitive preconditions for behavior intended by the mechanism and thereby to derive implications for the design of mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach Based on an analysis of the requirements of the decision context, the authors describe a systematic way of incorporating different BR concepts into an agent learning model. The approach is illustrated by analyzing an incentive scheme suggested for truthful reporting in budgeting contexts, which is an adapted Groves mechanism scheme. Findings The study describes systematic ways in which to derive BR agents for research questions where behavioral aspects might matter. The authors show that BR concepts may lead to other outcomes than the intended truth-inducing effect. A modification of the mechanism to more distinguishable levels of payments improves the results in terms of the intended effect. Research limitations/implications The presented BR concepts as simulated by agent models cannot model human behavior in its full complexity. The simplification of complex human behavior is a useful analytical construct for the controlled analysis of a few aspects and an understanding of the potential consequences of those aspects of human behavior for mechanism design. Originality/value The paper specifies the idea of a computational testbed for mechanism design based on BR concepts. Beyond this, a systematic and stepwise approach is shown to formalize bounded rational behavior by agents based on a requirements analysis, including benchmark models for the comparison and evaluation of BR concepts.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
29.40%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: This international journal contributes to the successful implementation and development of work teams and team-based organizations by providing a forum for sharing experience and learning to stimulate thought and transfer of ideas. It seeks to bridge the gap between research and practice by publishing articles where the claims are evidence-based and the conclusions have practical value. Effective teams form the heart of every successful organization. But team management is one of the hardest challenges faced by managers.
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