法国同居夫妇的税收最小化

IF 1.8 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

National Tax Journal Pub Date : 2022-05-13 DOI:10.1086/719427

O. Bargain, Damien Échevin, Audrey Etienne, Nicolas Moreau, Adrien Pacifico

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文研究了法国有孩子的同居夫妇的纳税申报表。这些夫妇形成两个独立的纳税单位，必须将子女最优地分配到父母一方的纳税单位，以优化退税。我们发现，在75%的同居家庭中，孩子的分配方式使纳税义务最小化。25%未能将负债最小化的家庭似乎使用了启发法，受到惯性的影响，可能无法完全合作，因为次优夫妇在随后的一段时间里往往会更多地分开，更少地结婚。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Tax Minimization by French Cohabiting Couples

This paper examines the tax returns of French cohabiting couples with children. These couples form two separate tax units and must optimally assign their children to the tax unit of one of the parents to optimize tax rebates. We find that children are allocated in a way that minimizes tax liability in 75 percent of cohabiting households. The 25 percent of households that fail to minimize their liability appear to use heuristics, are influenced by inertia, and possibly fail to fully cooperate as suboptimal couples tend to separate more and marry less in the subsequent period.

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来源期刊

National Tax Journal Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

11.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The goal of the National Tax Journal (NTJ) is to encourage and disseminate high quality original research on governmental tax and expenditure policies. Articles published in the regular March, June and September issues of the journal, as well as articles accepted for publication in special issues of the journal, are subject to professional peer review and include economic, theoretical, and empirical analyses of tax and expenditure issues with an emphasis on policy implications. The NTJ has been published quarterly since 1948 under the auspices of the National Tax Association (NTA). Most issues include an NTJ Forum, which consists of invited papers by leading scholars that examine in depth a single current tax or expenditure policy issue. The December issue is devoted to publishing papers presented at the NTA’s annual Spring Symposium; the articles in the December issue generally are not subject to peer review.